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UTAH'S GRAND STAIRCASE: THE RIGHT
PATH TO WILDERNESS PRESERVATION?
JAMES R. RASBAND*
INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 1996, President Clinton stood at the South
Rim of the Grand Canyon in Arizona and exercised his broad
authority under the Antiquities Act' to set aside 1.7 million acres
of public land, northward in Utah, as the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument ("the Monument" or "Grand
Staircase").2 Securely separated from Utah by the wondrous
* Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. I am grateful to Kevin Worthen and Ester Rasband for their thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to Troy Smith and Patrick Malone for
their able research assistance. Comments can be directed to rasbandj@
lawgate.byu.edu.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994). Section 2 of the Antiquities Act delegates broad
authority to the President to create national monuments:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and
prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest
that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Government
of the United States to be national monuments, and may reserve as a part
thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be confined
to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of
the objects to be protected.
Id.
2. See Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996). The Monument takes
the first part of its name from "a vast geologic stairway, named the Grand Staircase
by pioneering geologist Clarence Dutton, which rises 5,500 feet to the rim of Bryce
Canyon in an unbroken sequence of great cliffs and plateaus." Id. The latter portion
of the name reflects the inclusion, in the northeastern reaches of the Monument, of
the Escalante Canyons area, which includes "several major arches and natural
bridges" and "narrow, serpentine canyons, where erosion has exposed sandstone and
shale deposits in shades of red, maroon, chocolate, tan, gray, and white." Id. The
Monument also includes "the upper Paria Canyon system, major components of the
White and Vermilion Cliffs, the Kaiparowits Plateau," and "the spectacular Circle
Cliffs and part of the Waterpocket Fold." Id. A visit to the Monument leaves little
question that this magnificent part of the Colorado Plateau, or at least major
portions of it, are worthy of monument designation and preservation. But see infra
note 154 (questioning whether the Kaiparowits is worthy of designation). For a
thorough examination of the Monument's resources and a description of the physical
setting of the Monument, see VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE:
EXAMINING UTAH'S NEWEST NATIONAL MONUMENT 3-40 (Robert B. Keiter et al. eds.,
1998) [hereinafter VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE].
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chasm and the forbidding Kaibab Plateau beyond,3 the President
was subjected to heavy criticism by a furious Utah congressional
delegation, none of which attended the event.4 The delegation,
which had only learned of the President's intentions in a
Washington Post story eleven days before the proclamation,5
described the President's action as a shameful and arrogant act
of political opportunism and cried foul over the Clinton
Administration's failure to consult it or give any public notice of
3. A spokesperson for the Clinton Administration acknowledged that the
President chose to announce his decision in Arizona rather than Utah in part
because of his view (which proved correct) that he had a better chance of garnering
Arizona's electoral votes than Utah's. See It's All About Politics, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Sept. 18, 1996, at A6; see also infra note 126 (discussing this political calculation);
infra note 134 (discussing other reasons for holding the announcement ceremony in
Arizona).
4. See Jim Woolf, A Pretty, Great Monument?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996,
at Al (comments of Sen. Hatch); Lee Davidson, Green Light for Proposal Has Utahns
Seeing Red, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 18, 1996, at Al. Even the delegation's lone
Democrat, Representative Bill Orton, said of the President's action: "I think it is a
monument to political blunders and is unwise, unneeded and premature." Davidson,
supra, at Al; see also Laurie Sullivan Maddox, It's a Monumental Day for Utah,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 18, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Maddox, A Monumental Day]
(quoting Rep. Bill Orton: "[S]hame on [President Clinton]"). In the end, Orton may
have paid the price for the President's decision with his congressional seat. In the
November 1996 congressional elections, he garnered only half as many votes in Kane
and Garfield counties, where the Monument is situated, as he had in 1994. Compare
UTAH OFFICE OF LT. GOv./SEC. OF STATE, STATE OF UTAH GENERAL ELECTIONS 1994,
at S7875-1 (1995) (47.39% of vote in Garfield County; 53.07% of vote in Kane
County), with UTAH OFFICE OF LT. Gov./SEC. OF STATE, STATE OF UTAH GENERAL
ELECTIONS 1996, at S7875-1 (1996) (23.67% of vote in Garfield County; 27.96% of
vote in Kane County). See also Dennis Romboy, Computer Shutdown Added to Nail-
Biting in Cannon-Orton Race, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 6, 1996, at A9. Apparently, this
result was foreseen by the Clinton Administration. See Laurie Sullivan Maddox,
Taking Swipes at Clinton, Utahns Vow to Fight Back, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19,
1996, at A5 [hereinafter Maddox, Taking Swipes] ('Talk among the Utah delegation
was that administration officials had acknowledged the move may cost Democrats
their only House seat in the state---Orton's-but that they considered him
expendable.").
5. See Prepared Statement of Senator Robert F. Bennett Before the House
Resources Committee National Parks and Public Lands Subcommittee Oversight
Hearing on the Creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, FED.
NEWS SERV., Apr. 29, 1997; Tom Kenworthy, President Considers Carving National
Monument out of Utah Land, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1996, at A3 (breaking the
Monument story); see also 143 CONG. REC. H8398, H8399 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1997)
(statement of Rep. Hansen); id. at H8411 (statement of Rep. Schaffer of Colorado
noting that although President Clinton refused to consult with the Utah delegation,
he did consult with Colorado Governor Roy Romer, current chairman of the
Democratic National Committee, and Robert Redford, an actor and environmental
activist).
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the proposal.6 Residents of Kane and Garfield counties, the
southern Utah counties within which the Monument is located,
were even less kind. They hung President Clinton and Interior
Secretary Bruce Babbitt in effigy and subjected them to
vituperative criticism.7 In the counties' view, the proclamation
was an illegal expansion of the Antiquities Act. They also
claimed it would destroy the last hope for good wages in the area,
which was, they said, poised for a boom because of vast, low-
sulphur coal reserves within the Monument.8 Not all Utahns, of
course, were so angry. Many supported the Monument.9 And
6. See Maddox, Taking Swipes, supra note 4, at A5 (quoting statement of Sen.
Hatch of Utah that "[i]n all my 20 years in the U.S. Senate, I have never seen a
clearer example of the arrogance of federal power .... Indeed, this is the mother of
all land grabs"); see also Christopher Rosche, Bennett: Papers Prove Clinton 'Misled'
Utahns, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 24, 1997, at A4 (describing Sen. Bennett's argument
that documents proved that the President's "overriding motive" in creating the
Monument "was to boost [his] re-election chances"). Politicians from other states
joined in the chorus. See Maddox, Taking Swipes, supra note 4, at A5 (Sen. Burns
of Montana said the proclamation was the act of a "tyrant" and Sen. Craig of Idaho
called it a "phenomenal misuse of power").
7. See, e.g., Paul Larmer, Beauty and the Beast, HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Apr. 14,
1997, at 1 (quoting Kane County Commissioner's statement that "[lt was arrogant
as hell for the president to use the law to his advantage as he did"); Maddox, A
Monumental Day, supra note 4, at Al (describing "loss of rights" rally held in Kane
County on the day of the Monument's designation); Woolf, supra note 4, at A4
(quoting a Kanab resident: "What I'd like to do is declare war on the White House
... but my church and the laws don't allow me to do that."); Kane County Holds a
Bitter Wake After Monument Decision, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996, at A7; David
Maraniss, Clinton Acts to Protect Utah Land, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al
(quoting executive director of the Utah Association of Local Governments as saying
"[t]his is the most arrogant gesture I have seen in my lifetime . . . . The only
comparable act I can think of is when a country is ruled by a king and he sweeps his
hand across a map and says, 'It will be thus!' ").
8. In the early 1990's Kanab, the largest town in Kane County, lost some 500
timber and uranium jobs. See Larmer, supra note 7, at 1.
Families that had a primary bread winner earning $20 to $30 an hour
suddenly had to move or change occupations. Those who wanted to stay
had to send Dad to work as a trucker or laborer in a distant city and add
Mom, grandma and the kids to the work force, most often cleaning hotel
rooms and flipping hamburgers for tourists at $5 an hour.
Id. The local hope was that the relatively high-wage timber and uranium jobs would
be replaced by mining jobs from the land owned by Andalex on the Kaiparowits
Plateau. See id; see also infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text (discussing
Andalex's proposed mine).
9. Compare Bob Bernick, Jr., 52% Oppose Monument, DESERET NEwS, Oct. 20,
1996, at Al (poll showing 19% strongly favoring, 18% somewhat favoring, 20%
somewhat opposing, 32% strongly opposing the Monument, and 12% not knowing),
with Time Softens Opposition to Monument, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 16, 1997, at C1
(poll showing decrease from 47% to 32% of Utahns opposed to the Monument).
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wilderness advocates were almost as hyperbolic in their praise of
.President Clinton as the counties were in their criticism.1"
Two years later, the angry rhetoric over the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument continues to reverberate in Utah,
in the federal courts, and in Congress. Six bills proposing to
amend or repeal the Antiquities Act have been offered in
Congress.11 Three lawsuits have been filed challenging the
President's authority to create the Monument.12 And despite the
language in the proclamation protecting "valid existing rights,"
environmental organizations have aggressively disputed access
to and use of federally leased land and non-federal inholdings
within the Monument." What casual observers may not realize
is that this polarized dispute over the Monument is only the
latest skirmish in a lengthy and acrimonious battle over how
much of the spectacular canyons and plateaus of Utah's red rock
country should be preserved as national monuments, national
parks, and wilderness areas.1
4
10. See, e.g., Woolf, supra note 4, at Al (quoting Ken Rait of the Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance that, by designating the Monument, Clinton had "joined the
ranks of the greatest conservation leaders in U.S. history"). Compare Woolf, supra
note 4 (quoting Vice-President Gore's praise of President Clinton: "The reason [the
Antiquities Act] hasn't always been used is, let's face it, it takes courage to take a
step like this. It takes guts."), with infra note 85 and accompanying text (noting that
presidents have used the Antiquities Act 102 times). Two days before the Monument
was declared, environmental groups took out a full-page advertisement in the New
York Times urging readers to call the White House in support of creating the
Monument. See Maddox, A Monumental Day, supra note 4, at Al.
11. See infra Part II.D (discussing these bills).
12. The Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration filed a
lawsuit in federal court on June 23, 1997. See Jim Woolf, Utah's Monument's Size
Prompts New Lawsuit, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 23, 1997, at Al; see also infra note 148
(citing district court filings). On that same day, the Utah Association of Counties
filed a lawsuit seeking to overturn the Monument designation. See Woolf, supra note
4, at Al. Earlier, in October 1996, a lawsuit challenging the President's creation of
the Monument had been filed by the Western States Coalition and the Mountain
States Legal Foundation. See id. That suit was refiled by the Mountain States Legal
Foundation on November 5, 1997. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Clinton, No.
97CV 0863G (D. Utah filed Nov. 5, 1997). The suit of the Utah School and
Institutional Trust Lands Administration has subsequently been settled as part of
a land exchange worked out by Interior Secretary Babbitt and Utah Governor
Leavitt. See infra Part II.C (discussing this land exchange).
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part I (discussing this history). The beauty, vitality, and severity
of Utah's red rock country, and the Colorado Plateau within which it is situated, is
as hard to capture in words as the feelings of solitude, awe, and foreboding it
inspires. For evocative descriptions of the area, see WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE
HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN 172-73 (1954) (quoting C.E. DUTTON, 2 THE TERTIARY
UTAH'S GRAND STAIRCASE
With all of the focus on the Grand Staircase, it seems an
opportune time to review the course of Utah's red rock wilderness
war and propose some fixed stars that should guide withdrawal 5
decisions in the future. To that end, this article first reviews the
long-running Utah wilderness debate to elucidate the broader
context for the anger generated by the designation of the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument. Using the Grand Stair-
case controversy as a departure point, the article then suggests
that for future withdrawal decisions to maintain their ennobling
quality, a different process is necessary. This insight comes from
wilderness literature.
The consistent message of wilderness literature, as revealed
in the philosophical writings of Henry David Thoreau, John Muir,
Aldo Leopold, Joseph Sax, and other.preservationists, as well as
in the recreational writing of anglers, mountaineers, and hunters,
is that adherence to certain virtues in our interaction with
wilderness redeems and ennobles us. As Joseph Sax explained in
his thoughtful book Mountains Without Handrails,6
preservationists "are really moralists at heart, and people are
very much at the center of their concerns. They encourage people
to immerse themselves in natural settings and to behave there in
certain ways, because they believe such behavior is redeeming."'7
This article concludes that the basic "redeeming" virtues
articulated in wilderness literature-virtues like sportsmanship,
restraint, deliberation, sensitivity to impact, and patient
woodcraft-are also the fixed stars that should guide withdrawal
HISTORY OF THE GRAND CANYON DISTRICT, UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
MONOGRAPHS 58-59 (1882)); WALLACE STEGNER, THE SOUND OF MOUNTAIN WATER
131-36 (1980); TESTIMONY: WRITERS OF THE WEST SPEAK ON BEHALF OF UTAH
WILDERNESS (compiled by Stephen Trimble & Terry Tempest Williams, 1996);
EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE (1988); CRAIG L. CHILDS, STONE DESERT: A
NATURALIST'S EXPLORATION OF CANYONLANDS NATIONAL PARK (1995).
15. The term "withdrawal" refers to actions taken by Congress or the executive
branch to set aside an area of federal land otherwise available for settlement, sale,
location, or entry under the public land laws, in order to maintain other public values
in the area or to reserve the area for a particular purpose or program. See 43 U.S.C.
§ 1702(0) (1994) (Federal Land Policy Management Act's definition of "withdrawal").
16. JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE
NATIONAL PARKS (1980).
17. Id. at 103; see also id. at 15 (describing the preservationist as "a prophet
for a kind of secular religion"); id. at 17 ("The early preservationists and park
advocates assumed, without ever explaining, that personal engagement with nature
would build in the individual those qualities of character that the existence of parks
symbolized for us collectively.").
1999]
488 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
decisions and, more generally, preservation advocacy. In essence,
the same virtues that govern our interaction with wilderness
should govern our acquisition of wilderness. In the end, it is not
enough simply to have "bagged" the Grand Staircase, any more
than it is sufficient simply to bag a deer, net a fish, run a river, or
scale a mountain; it is the manner by which the result is achieved
that ultimately ennobles or devalues the withdrawal. The sad
irony of the Grand Staircase designation process is that we value
wilderness and the Monument for their ability to develop within
us the very virtues that the Clinton Administration seemed to
ignore in securing the Monument.
Having developed the applicability of wilderness virtues to
the project of wilderness acquisition, this article suggests how the
Antiquities Act could be amended to reflect those virtues.
Finally, it concludes that regardless whether the law is changed,
voluntary adherence to wilderness virtues in the withdrawal
process should be part of a preservation advocacy ethic.
I. THE RED ROCK WILDERNESS WAR IN UTAH
A. Previous Withdrawals of Public Land Within Utah
Federal withdrawal and reservation of land from the public
domain is not new to Utah. Almost sixty-four percent of Utah,
some 33.6 million acres, is owned by the federal government and
managed by its constituent agencies.' 8 Of that acreage, approx-
imately twenty-two million acres are managed by the Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM"), 19 a portion of which were withdrawn
for the Monument. The remaining acreage was previously
withdrawn in the form of six additional national monuments
(Cedar Breaks, Hovenweep, Timpanogos Cave, Dinosaur,
Rainbow Bridge, and Natural Bridges),2" six national forests
18. See GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
14 (3d ed. 1993).
19. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,602, 75,605 (1980) (noting that the BLM administers
22,075,916 acres of public lands within the State of Utah). The BLM was created in
1946 by the merger of the Federal Grazing Service and the General Land Office. See
COGGINS ET AL., supra note 18, at 138. For an overview of the administrative
structure of the BLM, see GEORGE C. COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 7.02[2][e] (1997).
20. Cedar Breaks, Proclamation No. 2054, 48 Stat. 1705 (1933) (boundary
adjusted by Act of Mar. 7, 1942, 56 Stat. 141 and Act of June 30, 1961, 75 Stat. 198
(now 6,154 acres)); Hovenweep, Proclamation No. 1654, 42 Stat. 2299 (1923)
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(Ashley, Dixie, Fishlake, Manti-LaSal, Uinta, and Wasatch-
Cache),2  five national parks (Arches, Bryce Canyon,
Canyonlands, Capitol Reef, and Zion), two national recreation
areas (Glen Canyon and Flaming Gorge), and one national
historic area (Golden Spike, celebrating the joining of the first
transcontinental railway).22
Even the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument is
not a wholly new idea. In the 1930s, Harold Ickes, Secretary of
the Interior under President Franklin Roosevelt, proposed that a
4.4 million acre area of Utah's red rock country be withdrawn as
the Escalante National Monument.23 In part because of local
opposition, the proposed monument, named after Father
Escalante, the Spanish priest who first explored the region,24 was
eventually shelved by the Roosevelt Administration." The seed
(enlarged by Proclamation No. 2924, 65 Stat. c8 (1951); Proclamation No. 2998, 67
Stat. c21 (1952); and Proclamation No. 3132, 70 Stat. c26 (1956) (now 784.93 acres
in Utah and Colorado)); Timpanogos Cave, Proclamation No. 1640, 42 Stat. 2285
(1922) (250 acres); Dinosaur, Proclamation No. 1313, 39 Stat. 1752 (1915) (enlarged
by Proclamation No. 2290, 53 Stat. 2454 (1938); Act of Sept. 8, 1960, 74 Stat. 857;
Notice of the Secretary of the Interior, Feb. 21, 1963, Mar. 27, 1964; Notice of the
Asst. Secretary of the Interior, Oct. 6, 1964; and Notice of the Dir. of the National
Park Service, Aug. 27, 1985 (now 204,355.49 acres in Utah and Colorado)); Rainbow
Bridge, Proclamation No. 1043, 36 Stat. 2703 (1910) (160 acres); Natural Bridges,
Proclamation No. 804, 35 Stat. 2183 (1908) (boundary enlarged by Proclamation No.
881, 36 Stat. 2502 (1909); Proclamation No. 1323, 39 Stat. 1764 (1916); and
Proclamation No. 3486, 76 Stat. 1495 (1962) (now 7,636.49 acres)).
21. See USDA Forest Service: Utah National Forests (visited Oct. 7, 1998)
<http://www.fs.fed.us/recreationlstates/ut.html> (listing acreage within Utah's
national forests).
22. See, e.g., Jim Woolf, Monument: Utah Decision Expected Soon, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Sept. 10, 1996, at Al; Todd Wilkinson, A Monumental Challenge: Controversy
over Pres. Bill Clinton's Creation of Utah's Grand Staircase-Escalante into a
National Monument, 71 NAT'L PARKS 28 (1997); see also Designation of National
Park System Units (visited Oct. 7, 1998) <http://www.nps.gov/legacy/nomenclature.
html#nparks> (listing Parks, Recreation Areas, and Historical Areas).
23. See Elmo R. Richardson, Federal Park Policy in Utah: The Escalante
National Monument Controversy of 1935-1940, 33 UTAH HIST. Q. 109 (1965); see also
Christopher Smith, Grand Staircase National Monument: It's a New Name-But an
Old Idea, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 6, 1996, at Al.
24. See Richardson, supra note 23, at 114. See generally HERBERT E. BOULTON,
PAGEANT IN THE WILDERNESS (Utah State Hist. Society 1950) (translated and
annotated diary and itinerary of Father Escalante).
25. Initially, graziers raised the most objections to the proposed monument. See
Richardson, supra note 23, at 114-16 ("'This is just a little harder rap than we can
take without putting up a battle,' a stockman concluded, 'You can make it legal but
you can never make it moral.' "). Later, state officials voiced objection because they
wanted the state to retain jurisdiction over the lands and they feared that the
monument would limit development of dams along the Green and Colorado rivers,
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planted by Secretary Ickes, however, ultimately bore fruit. Much
of the area intended as the Escalante National Monument was set
aside as Canyonlands National Park and the Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area,26 and the new monument set aside by
President Clinton now bears the name Secretary Ickes proposed.
Although the Antiquities Act ("the Act") was not employed to
circumvent local opposition to the original Escalante National
Monument proposal, use of the Act is certainly not a novelty in
Utah. Of the national parks in Utah, all except Canyonlands
started as national monuments.2" And, although not every
designation drew criticism,2" the sort of censure that occurred
with the Grand Staircase designation had been heard before. In
January 1969, just ninety minutes before he was to leave office,
President Lyndon Johnson signed Antiquities Act proclamations
adding some 264,000 acres to Arches and Capitol Reef National
Monuments.29 The reaction in Utah was frustration and
which they believed were necessary for future development of the region. See id. at
118. Unwilling to snub fellow Democrats in Utah, for several years, the Interior
Department wrestled with Utah officials over these issues. See id. at 119-33. When
America entered World War II, support shifted in favor of developing dams along the
Colorado and Green rivers. In March 1942, Secretary Ickes wrote Utah's new
governor, Democrat Herbert Maw, of the Administration's decision to support such
dams and the Escalante National Monument idea was dead, at least for a time. See
id. at 132-33.
26. See Richardson, supra note 23, at 115 (map of proposed Escalante National
Monument); see also Canyonlands National Park Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-590, 78
Stat. 934; Glen Canyon National Recreation Area Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-593, 86
Stat. 1311.
27. See Proclamation No. 2246, 50 Stat. 1856 (1937) (Capitol Reef) (boundary
enlarged by Proclamation No. 3249, 72 Stat. c48 (1958) and Proclamation No. 3888,
83 Stat. 922 (1969)); Proclamation No. 1875, 46 Stat. 2988 (1929) (Arches) (boundary
enlarged by Proclamation No. 2312, 53 Stat. 2504 (1938); Proclamation No. 3360, 74
Stat. c.79 (1960); and Proclamation No. 3887, 83 Stat. 920 (1969)); Proclamation No.
1664, 43 Stat. 1914 (1923) (Bryce Canyon); Proclamation No. 877, 36 Stat. 2498
(1909) (Mukuntuweap) (name changed to Zion and boundary enlarged by
Proclamation No. 1435, 40 Stat. 1760 (1918)). Utahns now seem to regard the state's
national parks as the state's crown jewels, see infra note 33, and it seems likely that
the Grand Staircase eventually will be looked upon with similar pride.
28. Interestingly enough, a review of Utah's major newspapers at the time of
the earlier designations reveals nothing like the protest that greeted the Grand
Staircase designation. If anything is notable, it is that the designations drew so little
attention. See, e.g., Utah Given Another National Monument, DESERET NEWS, Apr.
23, 1929, at 1 (three brief paragraphs on Arches); President Passes Two Monuments
in Southern Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 23, 1929, at 1 (two paragraphs on Arches).
29. See Proclamation No. 3887, 83 Stat. 920 (1969) (adding 48,943 acres to
Arches); Proclamation No. 3888, 83 Stat. 922 (1969) (adding 215,056 acres to Capitol
Reef); see also Gordon Eliot White, Johnson Enlarges Arches, Capitol Reef, DESERET
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anger that now has a familiar sound. Senator Wallace F.
.Bennett, the father of Utah's current Senator Robert Bennett,
criticized the expansions with language similar to that which his
son would later use to criticize the Grand Staircase, arguing that
the proclamations were a "last gasp attempt to embalm a little
more land in the West," and protesting that the actions were
"arbitrary" and "unilateral ... with no notice whatsoever, without
hearing any interested group, without prior consultation with
Congress and without consultation or discussion with state
officials."3 Other Utahns of both political parties joined in this
criticism of the surreptitious manner in which the monuments
had been enlarged.3 ' Nearby communities and other interests
that relied on the public lands for their livelihoods were
particularly upset.32 Eventually the criticism died down, and the
NEWS, Jan. 20, 1969, at B1 (reporting on the designation); LBJ Proclamations
Enlarge Two of Utah's Monuments, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 21, 1969, § 2, at 13 (same).
30. Gordon Eliot White, Hearings Due on Land Plan, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 22,
1969, at Bi; see also Bennett Blasts LBJ 'Land Grab' to Expand 2 Monuments in
Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 22, 1969, § 2, at 17 (reporting additional criticism).
Compare id., with Frank Clifford & Paul Richter, Utah Officials Oppose U.S. Plan
for Land, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1996, at A3 (reporting statement of Sen. Robert
Bennett that the Grand Staircase designation was "the height of arrogance," and also
reporting the statement of the spokeswoman for Sen. Bennett that "[t]he president
is attempting to establish the largest national monument in the lower 48 states by
administrative fiat without any consultation with the Congress or the people directly
affected").
31. See Park Fiat Draws Fire, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 18, 1969, at Bi (reporting
criticism of the manner in which the monuments were expanded by Democrats
Governor Calvin Rampton and Sen. Frank Moss as well as Republican Sen. Bennett
and Congressman Laurence Burton); see also Frank Brunsman, Utahns Respond
Speedily, Critically to Enlargement of 2 Monuments, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 26, 1969,
at B4 (reporting on Utah officials' criticisms of the proclamations); Bennett Blasts
LBJ 'Land Grab'to Expand 2 Monuments in Utah, supra note 30, § 2, at 17 (same);
Gordon Eliot White, LBJ's Last 'Great Society'Effort, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 21, 1969,
at All (noting that "the secrecy the administration sought to impose was intense"
and that "little or no regard was taken of the 31,200 acres of state land involved");
Editorial, Hold Park Hearings, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 21, 1969, at A10 (critical
editorial); Editorial, Mr. Johnson's Arbitrary Land Grab, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 22,
1969, § 1, at 14 (critical editorial). But see For More Annexation, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Feb. 5, 1969, at A12 (noting that conservationists were pleased with the
proclamations).
32. See Utah Town Labels Capitol Reef Monument Addition Its "Death
Certificate," SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 24, 1969, at C12 (arguing that the expansion of
Capitol Reef would devastate the Boulder economy which was built primarily on
cattle ranching); see also Barbara Springer, LBJ's "Last-Minute" Action Angers
Miners, Stockmen, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 21, 1969, § 2, at 13 ("Representatives of
Utah mining, cattle and sheep industries Monday expressed indignation and
disbelief .. "); id. (quoting president of the Utah Cattlemen's Association: "We'd
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expanded Capitol Reef and Arches National Parks are now among
the crown jewels of Utah's tourism industry,33 but the embers of
resentment toward unilateral federal preservation efforts
continued to smolder.
B. FLPMA and the Inventory of Utah Wilderness Areas
The controversy over withdrawal and management of Utah's
red rock country heated up again in 1976 with the passage of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"),34 and it
has remained intense since that time. Section 603 of FLPMA
directed the BLM to inventory roadless areas of 5000 acres or
more on the public lands and assess whether they had wilderness
characteristics as described in the Wilderness Act.35 Areas with
such wilderness characteristics were to be identified as
rather go down fighting than lying on our backs."); Douglas Christensen, Meeting
Opposes Land Withdrawals, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 5, 1969, at A9 (reporting the
statement of Garfield County Commissioner Dale Marsh despairing that if the
proclamation was not rescinded, "[r]oad development in the area will stop; existing
roads and trails within the areas' boundaries will be blocked; oil and gas
development will stop; grazing rights will be terminated; mining operations will stop;
watershed and soil conservation will stop; logging and lumbering will stop; hunting
and recreational expansion will stop").
33. See Tom Wharton, Utah's National Parks, Monuments, Recreation Areas
Offer Diversity, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 18, 1997, at L8 ("Arches, Canyonlands, Capitol
Reef, Bryce Canyon, and Zion ... are the crown jewels of Utah's tourism industry,
drawing thousands of visitors to southern Utah from all parts of the world.").
34. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). FLPMA is the primary
governing statute for the public lands under the jurisdiction of the BLM.
35. Id. § 1782(a) ("Within fifteen years after Oct. 21, 1976, the Secretary shall
review those roadless areas of five thousand acres or more and roadless islands of the
public lands, identified during the inventory required by section 1711 (a) of this title
as having wilderness characteristics described in the Wilderness Act .... "). The
Wilderness Act defines wilderness, in significant part, as:
[A]n area of underdeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval
character and influence, without permanent improvements or human
habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural
conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work
substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude
or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five
thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its
preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also
contain ecological, geological, 6r other features of scientific, educational,
scenic, or historical value.
16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994). For an overview of wilderness issues and the Wilderness
Act, see MICHAEL FROME, BATTLE FOR THE WILDERNESS (1997).
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Wilderness Study Areas ("WSAs").36 Once the inventory was
complete, the BLM was to conduct a study of each WSA, including
a mineral survey, to determine and recommend to the President,
and the President in turn to recommend to Congress, whether
any of the WSAs should be designated as wilderness.38
Pending a final decision on wilderness status by Congress,
FLPMA requires the BLM to manage the WSAs so as not to
impair their suitability for preservation as wilderness, whereas
land not so designated is to be managed under multiple use
principles. 9 It was for this reason that the BLM's inventory
attracted significant interest in Utah, where BLM lands comprise
over forty percent of the state.40
As a result of its section 603 inventory, the BLM originally
designated 2,959,696 acres as WSAs. 41 Dismayed by what they
viewed as the intolerably small percentage of the twenty-two
million acres of BLM land identified from the inventory as WSAs,
conservation groups contended that the BLM's work was not
really an inventory at all, but instead an improper effort to zone
vast tracts of BLM land for resource exploration and
36. See supra note 35; see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, WILDERNESS INVENTORY HANDBOOK 10-14 (1978). The inventory
process was to occur in two primary steps: an initial inventory to identify within each
state wilderness inventory units of roadless areas, and then an intensive inventory
to determine whether each unit met the wilderness characteristics criteria required
for a WSA. See id. Both the initial and intensive inventories were to be conducted
by BLM district managers, following which there was to be a public comment period
and then a final decision by the BLM State Director identifying the WSAs on the
public lands. See id. at 10-11, 14-15.
37. See supra note 35; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1994) ("[P]rior to any
recommendations for the designation of an area as wilderness the Secretary shall
cause mineral surveys to be conducted by the United States Geological Survey and
the United States Bureau of Mines to determine the mineral values, if any, that may
be present in such areas.").
38. See supra note 35.
39. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1994). "[E]xisting mining and grazing uses and
mineral leasing in the manner and degree in which the same was being conducted
on [the date of approval of this Act]" were, however, allowed to continue "[p]rovided,
that, in managing the public lands the Secretary shall by regulation or otherwise
take any action required to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands
and their resources or to afford environmental protection." Id.; see also 43 U.S.C.
§ 1712(c)(1) (1994) (providing for multiple use of areas not designated as WSAs).
40. See WILDERNESS AT THE EDGE 34 (The Utah Wilderness Coalition ed., 1990);
see also 45 Fed. Reg. 75,602, 75,605 (1980) (noting that the BLM administers
22,075,916 acres of public lands within the State of Utah).
41. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,602, 75,605 (1980) (publishing final inventory decision).
The total acreage figure included 248,048 acres of land that had been identified as
a primitive or natural area prior to the passage of FLPMA. See id.
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development. 2 They contended that in many cases roadless areas
excluded from WSA designation conveniently coincided with the
presence of coal and other mineral deposits.43 The conservation
groups' subsequent efforts to increase the number of WSAs and
the acreage available for wilderness designation is one of the real
success stories of wilderness advocacy.
Led by the Utah Wilderness Association, several conservation
groups formally protested the inventory to the BLM and, when
that was largely unsuccessful,44 appealed the BLM's decision to
the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA").45 In what was the
largest IBLA appeal of its kind, they argued that approximately
925,000 acres had been improperly excluded from consideration
as wilderness.46 In a resounding victory for the conservation
groups, the IBLA reversed the BLM on two units involving 16,310
acres and remanded to the BLM for further inventory nineteen
units totaling over 800,000 acres.47 On remand, the BLM
determined that over 538,000 additional acres exhibited
wilderness characteristics and should be accorded WSA status.
Conservation groups then appealed again, arguing that 250,000
42. See Ray Wheeler, The BLM Wilderness Review, in WILDERNESS AT THE EDGE
34, 34-39 (The Utah Wilderness Coalition ed., 1990).
43. See id. at 38.
44. The BLM did add additional acreage in eight of the WSAs protested by
conservation groups, although that was partially offset by dropping WSA status for
two units to which protests had been lodged by individuals. See Decision on Protests
to State Director's November 14, 1980 Decisions on Statewide Inventory, 46 Fed.
Reg. 15,332, 15,334 (1981).
45. See Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 72 I.B.L.A. 125 (1983). In addition to the Utah
Wilderness Association, 13 other organizations appealed. See id. at 126 n. 1. Seven
interveners, including the State of Utah, supported the BLM's position. See id. at
127 n.2. The appeal to the IBLA had, of course, been preceded by a protest to the
BLM's Utah Office. See 46 Fed. Reg. 15,332 (1981) (state office's denial of the
protest). The appeal argued against the BLM's decision to list 1,899,055 acres as
WSAs. See 72 I.B.L.A. 125 (1983). Conservation groups had previously appealed
certain special inventories, which had suggested an additional 312,593 acres of
WSAs. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,602, 75,605 (1980).
46. See 72 I.B.L.A. at 126-27. See generally Wheeler, supra note 42. "[O]ne of
the appeals] was 2000 pages long, containing 300 photographs and 120 affidavits.
Covering 925,000 acres on 29 roadless areas, it was the largest appeal of its kind in
the history of the IBLA." Id. at 39. The conservation groups would likely have
appealed more area if they had been given longer than the 30 days in which to
protest the agency's decision. See id. at 34 (recollection of Sierra Club activist that
"[i]f we had more time, money, and people, we might have appealed up to 2.9 million
acres in 122 inventory units").
47. See Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 86 I.B.L.A. 89, 89-90 (1985) (describing result
on prior appeal); see also Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 72 I.B.L.A. 125, 192 (1983)
(appendix listing decisions with respect to each unit appealed).
UTAH'S GRAND STAIRCASE
acres still had been improperly excluded.4" The IBLA again
reversed part of the BLM's decision, designating an additional
76,500 acres as WSAs.49 By the conclusion of the appeals process,
the BLM had identified eighty-two WSAs, which included
3,231,327 acres of land.5" Conservation groups had given the
BLM more than a 600,000 acre "boost."
Despite their successful appeals, conservationists continued
to believe that the BLM had vastly underestimated potential
wilderness areas. Determined to continue the fight, in February
1985 they formed the Utah Wilderness Coalition,5' whose
members were sent into the field to map their view of which BLM
lands should be designated as WSAs. 52 This mapping process was
given an additional spur in 1986 when the BLM, in its Draft
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), recommended that only
1,892,402 acres of the 3,231,327 acres identified as WSAs be
denominated wilderness areas by Congress.53 Based on its field
work, the Coalition responded to the Draft EIS by proposing 5.1
million acres of wilderness.54
Even after submitting their proposal, Coalition members
continued to perform field work, documenting and mapping
boundaries of proposed areas.55 In 1990, after thousands of hours
of such work, the Coalition revised its proposal to a final figure of
5.7 million acres of wilderness.56 Soon thereafter, in November
48. See 86 I.B.L.A. at 90.
49. See id.
50. See 1 UTAH STATE OFFICE, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, UTAH BLM
STATEWIDE WILDERNESS DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 35 (1986)
[hereinafter UTAH WILDERNESS DRAFT EIS]; see also 51 Fed. Reg. 4241 (1986)
(describing preparation of Draft EIS). An EIS is an analytical document that
evaluates impacts to the environment of a proposed action and reasonable
alternatives to the action. It is required by the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994). See infra note 98 (discussing NEPA). In the Final
EIS, the BLM added one WSA and raised the acreage on a few other WSAs for a total
of 3,235,834 acres. See 1 UTAH STATE OFFICE, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
UTAH BLM STATEWIDE WILDERNESS FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 62-
63 (1990) [hereinafter UTAH WILDERNESS FINAL EIS].
51. See Wheeler, supra note 42, at 39.
52. See id. at 40.
53. See 1 UTAH WILDERNESS DRAFT EIS, supra note 50, at 30; see also 51 Fed.
Reg. 4241 (1986) (announcing issuance of Draft EIS).
54. See 7 UTAH WILDERNESS FINAL EIS, supra note 50, at 246 (August 15, 1986
Comments of the Utah Wilderness Coalition on the Utah BLM Statewide Wilderness
Draft EIS). -
55. See Wheeler, supra note 42, at 40.
56. See id. The Utah Wilderness Coalition increased its wilderness proposal to
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1990, the BLM issued its Final EIS. Coalition pressure had
again increased the BLM's recommendation, albeit marginally.
In its final statement of proposed action, the BLM recommended
that 1,975,219 acres were suitable for inclusion in the National
Wilderness Preservation System.5"
Even before the Final EIS was issued, Utah wilderness bills
were proposed in Congress. In 1989, Representative Jim Hansen
of Utah introduced a bill to designate 1.4 million acres as
wilderness.59 In a competing bill, Representative Wayne Owens,
also of Utah, relied upon the Coalition's work to propose 5.4
million acres of wilderness.6 ° Essentially the same bills were
reintroduced during the next two Congresses, although during
the 103rd Congress, Representative Maurice Hinchey of New
York took over sponsorship of the bill introduced by
Representative Owens, who had given up his seat.61 Hinchey's
version of the bill added an additional 300,000 acres to the
proposal, bringing the total to the approximately 5.7 million acres
desired by the Utah Wilderness Coalition. 2 Neither side,
however, was able to advance its wilderness proposal. The bills
of Democrats Owens and Hinchey could not overcome opposition
from the Republicans in Utah's congressional delegation; and the
bills offered by Representative Hansen stood little chance in the
Democrat-controlled House. 3
8.5 million acres in July 1998. See Brent Israelsen, Wilderness Advocates Want 8.5
Million Acres, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 9, 1998, at B1; Dustin Solberg, Utah Finds 3
Million More Wild Acres, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 3, 1998, at 3.
57. See UTAH WILDERNESS FINAL EIS, supra note 50.
58. See id. at 3, 7. The BLM's own work had also been extensive. Between 1978
and 1992, a total of $10,052,733 was expended and approximately 2,777 work
months were charged to the wilderness program in Utah. See H.R. REP. No. 104-
396, at 11 (1995).
59. See H.R. 1501, 101st Cong. (1989) (1,405,625 acres). The 1.4 million acre
figure was based on the "Paramount Wilderness Quality Alternative" identified in
the Draft EIS. See id. § 2(a)(1); see also 1 UTAH WILDERNESS DRAFr EIS, supra note
50, at 40. That alternative was designed to include "those areas having minimum
conflicts with other resources, to the extent possible, but also key areas where
wilderness values clearly exceed other resource values if unavoidable conflicts exist."
Id. at 20.
60. See H.R. 1500, 101st Cong. (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-396, at 11
(describing prior legislation).
61. See H.R. REP. No. 104-396, at 11.
62. See id.
63. See id.; see also Daniel Glick, Utah: A Wilderness Shell Game, WILDERNESS,
Dec. 22, 1995, at 14 (discussing wilderness "stalemate" prior to 1994 elections). For
an overview and debate on some of the issues involving wilderness designation on
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With the advent of a Republican-controlled Congress in 1994,
the predominantly Republican Utah delegation saw an
opportunity finally to pass wilderness legislation for Utah. In
January 1995, the delegation requested that county
commissioners potentially affected by the wilderness legislation
recommend appropriate wilderness designations. 4 At the end of
a process that involved forty-five public meetings, the counties
recommended one million acres of wilderness and strong
language protecting existing uses and water rights.65 The
delegation took that recommendation, along with the BLM's
approximately 1.9 million acre recommendation in its Final EIS
and other input,66 and proposed in House Resolution 1745 and
Senate Bill 884 that 1.8 million acres be designated as
wilderness.67 In contest with those bills, Representative Hinchey
again introduced his bill proposing 5.7 million acres of
wilderness.68
Because the Republicans controlled Congress, House Resolu-
tion 1745 and Senate Bill 884 created substantial concern among
conservation groups. As great as their concern was over the bills'
limited acreage,69 they were perhaps equally concerned that the
bills developed a new approach to wilderness area manage-ment,
allowing construction of items such as reservoirs, trans-mission
lines, pipelines, and communication sites.7' They also were
adamantly opposed to the bills' "hard release" language, which
required that all BLM lands in Utah not designated as wilder-
ness be released from the non-impairment criteria of
the Colorado Plateau, see Symposium, Issues in Wilderness Designation on the
Colorado Plateau, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393 (1993).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 104-396, at 11 (1995).
65. See id.
66. See id. ("After all was done, testimony from over 600 individuals was heard
by the Utah delegation and Governor, the delegation received petitions signed by
over 16,700 people, and letters from over 2,300 people were considered.").
67. H.R. 1745, 104th Cong. (1995) (authored by Rep. Hansen); S. 884, 104th
Cong. (1995) (authored by Sen. Hatch); see also H.R. REP No. 104-396, at 11. In
December 1995, Representative Waldholtz of Utah proposed an amendment that
would have increased the acreage to approximately 2.2 million acres. See.141 CONG.
REC. H14315-16 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995). The amendment was never considered,
however, because the bill was withdrawn from consideration. See Jim Woolf, House
Shelves Utah Wilds Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 15, 1995, at Al.
68. See H.R. 1500, 104th Cong. (1995).
69. For an overview of conservationists' concerns with House Bill 1475, see H.R.
REP. No. 104-396, at 26-30 (1995) (dissenting views).
70. See H.R. 1745, 104th Cong. § 9 (1995); S. 884, 104th Cong. § 9 (1995).
1999]
498 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
FLPMA section 603(c) and managed for "non-wilderness multiple
uses."7' 1 Conservationists wanted the bills to include the type of
"soft release" language that had been included in prior wilderness
bills.72 Under soft release language, lands not designated as
wilderness are released from 603(c) management, but the BLM
may continue to consider an area's wilderness characteristics in
its land use plans, just as it looks at other multiple use options.73
After a fierce battle and a filibuster by Democratic Senator
Bill Bradley, the Utah delegation was unable to pass its
wilderness bill.7 ' The partisan divide was simply too large to
bridge. With Senator Hatch vowing that "we will never quit," the
Utah delegation promised to persevere in its efforts to pass the
wilderness bill.75 But in the end, no wilderness bill made it out of
the 104th Congress.
C. The Clinton Administration Turns to the Antiquities
Act and a Reinventory
Although the Utah delegation's wilderness bill was defeated,
the fact that it came so close to passage was troubling to conser-
vationists and the Clinton Administration ("the Administration"),
both of which preferred the 5.7 million acre Hinchey bill. With
the Republicans in control of Congress, and with the BLM having
identified only 3.2 million acres of WSAs, the Administration's
chances of securing its own wilderness objectives seemed dim. A
new direction was needed. Two flanking maneuvers presented
themselves. First, the Administration began to ponder the use of
the Antiquities Act to withdraw land and establish a national
monument. Second, Interior Secretary Babbitt wanted to change
the terms of the debate. Arguing that no agreement on
wilderness was possible as long as the opposing sides were "so far
apart on the threshold, fundamental issue of how much BLM land
71. H.R. 1745, 104th Cong. § 10(b) (1995); S. 884, 104th Cong. § 10(b) (1995)
(emphasis added).
72. See H.R. REP. No. 104-396, at 26-30 (dissenting views). Rep. Hinchey's
competing bill had no release language at all. See H.R. 1500, 104th Cong. (1995).
73. See H.R. REP. No. 104-396, at 26-30 (dissenting views).
74. For newspaper articles discussing the defeat of the delegation's proposal,
see, for example, Laurie Sullivan Maddox, GOP Loses Round, but Fight Isn't Over,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 31, 1996, at Al; Laurie Sullivan Maddox, Hatch Vows to
Revive Wilderness Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 28, 1996, at Al; Mark Obmascik, Utah
Wilds Come out a Winner, DENY. POST, Apr. 6, 1996, at Bi.
75. See Maddox, Hatch Vows to Revive Wilderness Bill, supra note 74.
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has wilderness characteristics," he initiated a reinventory of the
2.5 million acres within the Hinchey bill that had not been
identified as WSAs by the BLM in its initial inventory. 6
1. The Antiquities Act as a Withdrawal Tool
Historically, the President's authority to withdraw public
lands was quite broad. Not only had Congress passed a variety
of laws, the Antiquities Act among them, giving the President
withdrawal authority,77 the Supreme Court had also affirmed a
variety of executive withdrawals on the premise that congres-
sional acquiescence in the withdrawal constituted an implied del-
egation of authority to the President.78 With the passage of
76. See Jim Woolf, Babbitt vs. Hansen: Wilderness Debate in Utah Goes Back
to Drawing Board, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 1, 1996, at Al. Secretary Babbitt said that
he had assembled "a small team of career professionals, who have substantial
expertise in addressing wilderness issues in Utah and elsewhere, to take a careful
look at the lands identified in the 5.7 million-acre bill that have not been identified
by the BLM as wilderness-study areas, and report their findings." Id.
77. The Property Clause of the United States Constitution allocates primary
control over the public lands to Congress, giving it the power to "dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. In theory, therefore,
it is Congress, and not the executive branch, that makes withdrawal decisions.
Thus, Congress may exercise its constitutional power to make withdrawals by
statute (for example, create a national park or a national forest), or Congress may
pass legislation delegating that authority to the executive branch. See generally
David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to
Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279 (1982) (exploring the executive's
authority to withdraw public lands); Charles F. Wheatley, Jr., Withdrawals Under
the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 311 (1979) (same);
Richard M. Johannsen, Comment, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the
Antiquities Act, 56 WASH. L. REV. 439, 442-43 (1981) (same).
78. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). Quite a bit has
been written on the withdrawal authority of the executive branch. See, e.g., Getches,
supra note 77; Wheatley, supra note 77; Johannsen, supra note 77. The most
comprehensive review of executive withdrawal authority is the 1970 report of the
Public Land Law Review Commission ("PLLRC"). See U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REV.
COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970). Congress created the PLLRC in
1964 and charged it with preparing a series of reports on the plethora of public land
laws and to make recommendations for change. See Withdrawal, Reservation, and
Restriction of Public Lands: Hearings on H.R. 1785, H.R. 3342, H.R. 5252, H.R. 6377,
H.R. 4060, and H.R. 8783 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong. (1961-62); see also John F. Shepherd, Up
the Grand Staircase: Executive Withdrawals and the Future of the Antiquities Act,
43 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4-1, 4-27 to 4-29 (1996) (discussing establishment of
PLLRC). The PLLRC recommended that large scale withdrawals "be accomplished
only by act of Congress," U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAw REV. COMM'N, supra, at 54
500 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
FLPMA in 1976, Congress attempted to limit the executive
branch's withdrawal authority by repealing numerous statutory
provisions giving withdrawal power to the executive branch, 79 and
by giving the Secretary of the Interior new withdrawal authority
subject to congressional veto and a variety of pro-cedural
safeguards."0 FLPMA, however, did not repeal the Antiquities
Act.81
Although the Antiquities Act often escapes notice in
conversations about important environmental legislation, it has,
in fact, been one of the most powerful conservation tools of this
century. In keeping with its grant of independent presidential
(Recommendation 8), in part because of its finding that "areas set aside by executive
action.., have not had adequate study and there has not been proper consultation
with people affected or with the units of local government in the vicinity, particularly
as to precise boundaries." Id. at 1. Much of this recommendation was enacted in
FLPMA six years later, see infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text, although the
Antiquities Act was not repealed. See infra note 81 (discussing FLPMA's failure to
repeal the Antiquities Act). See generally Shepherd, supra, at 4-28 to 4-32
(discussing the relationship between the PLLRC report and FLPMA).
79. In FLPMA, Congress expressly repealed the implied delegation of authority
under Midwest Oil and otherwise severely curtailed the number of instances of
express congressional delegation, repealing twenty-nine statutory provisions
granting withdrawal authority to the executive branch. See Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976);
see also Getches, supra note 77, at 315; Wheatley, supra note 77, at 311, 317-19.
80. Under FLPMA, withdrawals of less than 5000 acres may be made by the
Secretary of the Interior: (1) without restriction when he "deems" the acreage
"desirable for a resource use"; (2) for a period of 20 years for an administrative site
or other federal facility; and (3) for not more than five years to preserve a tract then
under consideration for withdrawal by Congress. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d) (1994). For
withdrawals of more than 5000 acres, the Secretary may only make the withdrawal
for a period "of not more than twenty years." 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1) (1994). The
Secretary also must notify Congress of the withdrawal and provide Congress a
variety of information about the proposed withdrawal, including its proposed use, an
inventory of the site's natural resource values, impacts on present users of the land
to be withdrawn, an investigation of "suitable alternative sites," and a report on the
existence of mineral deposits. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2) (1994); see also infra note
288 (listing the elements of the Secretary's report). Congress then has 90 days to
pass a joint resolution disapproving the monument. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1)
(1994). If it does so, the withdrawal "shall terminate," as long as such a
congressional veto provision is constitutional. See id.; see also Getches, supra note
77, at 318 n.225 (exploring the issue). Finally, FLPMA allows the Secretary to make
an emergency withdrawal of any amount of lands for a period not to exceed three
years. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1994). See generally Wheatley, supra note 77, at 320-
26 (discussing FLPMA's withdrawal procedures).
81. The legislative history of FLPMA gives no indication of why the Antiquities
Act was not repealed along with the other statutes delegating withdrawal authority
to the executive. See Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-31 to 4-32 (discussing this issue
and speculating on possible reasons).
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withdrawal authority, the Antiquities Act, as initially enacted,
was intended to allow the President to make only small
withdrawals of public lands in order to protect prehistoric ruins
and Indian artifacts. 2 Yet, as soon as the Act was enacted,
presidents began to rely on its language allowing withdrawal of
"other objects of historic or scientific interest"83 to accomplish
much larger withdrawals.
Within two years of enactment, President Theodore Roosevelt
proclaimed eleven national monuments, including 800,000 acres
as the Grand Canyon National Monument, relying most often on
the Act's "scientific interest" language to justify the
withdrawals. 4 Since its enactment in 1906, presidents have used
the Antiquities Act 102 times to withdraw lands from the public
domain as national monuments.8 Prior to designation of the
Grand Staircase, the most recent use of the Act was by President
Jimmy Carter in 1978, when he invoked it to place some fifty-six
million acres of Alaska within seventeen different national
86monuments.
This conservation track record of the Antiquities Act must
also be viewed in light of the fact that there has never been a
successful legal challenge to any presidential use of the Act. Five
cases have addressed the propriety of a national monument
designation, and all five upheld the designation. In Cameron v.
United States, 7 the first case to address the Act, the Supreme
82. For an examination of the legislative history of the Antiquities Act, see
Getches, supra note 77, at 300-08; Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-8 to 4-13;
Johannsen, supra note 77, at 449-50; RONALD F. LEE, THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906
(1970).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 431(2) (1994) (setting forth statutory language).
84. See Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-14 n.57 (listing monuments and key
reserving language); see also Grand Canyon National Monument, Proclamation No.
794, 35 Stat. 2175 (1908).
85. See Bureau of Land Management, Monuments Established by Presidential
Proclamation (visited June 11, 1998) <http://www.blm.gov/nhp/news/alerts/
monuments.html> (describing each monument, the President who proclaimed it, the
objects reserved, the acreage of the initial reservation, and the subsequent history
and current status of the monument).
86. See generally Johannsen, supra note 77, at 453-56 (discussing the Alaska
withdrawals and the history of Alaska public lands legislation); see also Getches,
supra note 77, at 306, 322-24. President Carter's action was taken to preserve the
status quo during negotiation of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act ("ANILCA"). Congress terminated the national monuments upon passage of
ANILCA in 1980. See Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-33; see also S. REP. No. 96-413,
at 133-34 (1979) (discussing President Carter's.withdrawals and ANILCA).
87. 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
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Court interpreted the Act's language broadly. Ignoring the
legislative history suggesting the limited purpose of preserving
antiquities and artifacts, the Court focused on the Act's plain
language. It affirmed President Roosevelt's withdrawal of the
Grand Canyon on the grounds that the entire canyon was "an
object of unusual scientific interest" within the language of the
Act."s This broad interpretation of the Act was taken a step
further in Wyoming v. Franke,9 which involved a challenge to
President Franklin Roosevelt's designation of Jackson Hole
National Monument.9" There, the district court held that the
President's use of the Antiquities Act would only be overturned
if arbitrary and capricious.91 The court also held that the same
standard of review applied to the question of whether the size of
the monument was, as required by the Act, the "smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects
to be protected."92
88. Id. at 455-56. The Cameron Court did not offer any analysis of the history
or purpose of the Antiquities Act. See id. Its sparse reasoning may have resulted in
part from an antipathy to Cameron's position. Cameron had located a mining claim
at the head of the famous Bright Angel trail leading down into the Grand Canyon
from its south rim. See id. at 455. Despite the fact that the Secretary of the Interior
had found that the claim was not valuable for mining purposes, Cameron had
continued to occupy the land and charge access fees to tourists. See id. at 458. See
generally JOHN D. LESHY, THE MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 57-60
(1987) (discussing the Cameron litigation).
89. 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
90. The Jackson Hole National Monument was designated in 1943. See
Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (1943) (withdrawing 210,950 acres). It resulted
in a firestorm of criticism from the Wyoming congressional delegation. See 89 CONG.
REC. 2233-36 (1943). Although Congress passed a bill abolishing the monument, see
H.R. 2241, 78th Cong. (1943); 90 CONG. REC. 9196 (1944), President Roosevelt
pocket-vetoed the bill. See 90 CONG. REC. 9807 (1944). Congress remained defiant
and, from 1943 until 1950, it attached a provision to the Interior Department
appropriations bill prohibiting any funds from being used to manage the monument.
See S. REP. No. 81-1938, at 4 (1950). See generally Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-15
to 4-18 (describing this dispute). Finally, in 1950, Congress negotiated a compromise
with the Truman Administration under which the monument lands were added to
the Grand Teton National Park, see Act of Sept. 14, 1950, Pub. L. No. 787, 64 Stat.
849, and the Antiquities Act was amended to prohibit the President from designating
any additional national monuments in Wyoming. See 16 U.S.C. § 431a (1994).
91. See 58 F. Supp. at 895-96.
92. Id. at 896 ("What has been said with reference to the objects of historic and
scientific interest applies equally to the discretion of the Executive in defining the
area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected.'); see also supra note 1 (quoting the Antiquities Act). The court also made
clear that the motives of the President in making the designation were not relevant.
See 58 F. Supp. at 896.
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None of the three cases that followed departed from this basic
interpretation of the Antiquities Act. In Cappaert v. United
States,93 the Supreme Court, citing Cameron, summarily rejected
the argument that the Act applied only to archeological sites. 94
Likewise, in Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus,95 a district court
denied a challenge to President Carter's Alaska withdrawals
based in large part on the controlling authority of Cameron and
Cappaert.96 Finally, in Alaska v. Carter, a district court rejected
another challenge to President Carter's Alaska withdrawals. In
doing so, it added to the President's discretion under the
Antiquities Act by holding that the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA")9' does not apply to presidential use of the
Antiquities Act, because the Act specifically gives the President
"discretion,"99 and because the President is not a federal
93. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
94. See id. at 141-42. Specifically, the Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
the Antiquities Act could not be used to set-aside Devil's Hole, a deep limestone
cavern housing a pool and desert pupfish, which were remnants of the prehistoric
Death Valley Lake System. See id. The pool and pupfish, said the Court, were
objects of "historic or scientific interest." Id. at 142.
95. 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. Alaska 1980) (denying plaintiffs motion
for partial summary judgment). For a discussion of President Carter's Alaska
monument designations, see supra note 86.
96. Although the court said that some limitation must exist on presidential
exercise of the Antiquities Act, the court rejected plaintiffs partial summary
judgment motion challenging the designation of the monuments "on the basis of the
wording of the statute itself, its legislative history, its application by the Presidents
from the very inception . . . and finally and importantly, for the controlling
authorities [of] precedent established in Cameron and Cappaert." 14 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 1855. The court remarked that plaintiffs argument would have been
"perhaps easier if we were at 1906." Id.; see also Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-24
(discussing the case); Johannsen, supra note 77, at 457 & n.132 (same).
97. 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska 1978).
98. NEPA establishes environmental planning and assessment requirements
for all federal agencies. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1994). It does not mandate a
particular environmental outcome. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) ("NEPA itself does not mandate particular results,
but simply prescribes the necessary process. If the adverse environmental effects of
the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not
constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental
costs." (citations omitted)). Instead, NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the
environmental impact of any proposed major federal action and possible alternatives.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1994). It also mandates that the public have the
opportunity to review the proposed action. See id. See generally COGGINS, supra
note 18, at 332-36 (providing a brief overview of NEPA).
99. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994) ('The President of the United States is authorized,
in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation .... ").
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agency.'00 Alaska had argued that although the President himself
was not an agency within the meaning of NEPA, he should have
complied with NEPA because he relied on the recommendations
of the Department of the Interior in making the designation. 1 1
The court rejected that argument and held that as long as the
Interior Department made its recommendations at the request of
the President, NEPA would not apply.102
For an administration seeking to circumvent Congress on the
wilderness issue, the attractions of the Antiquities Act were,
therefore, evident. Any legal challenge was unlikely to be
successful. Moreover, using the Antiquities Act would avoid
FLPMA's congressional veto and procedural safeguards, including
its requirement of a report on the mineral potential of the
mineral-rich Kaiparowits Plateau.103 Use of the Antiquities Act
also would avert NEPA, as long as the Interior Department had
made its recommendations atthe request of the President. It is
thus unsurprising that members of the Clinton Administration
discussed using the Antiquities Act to create a monument in Utah
as early as August 1995,104 soon after the Utah delegation's
wilderness bill was introduced. 1 5 It was in March 1996, during
the final congressional debates on the wilderness bill, however,
that the consideration began in earnest. 1 6
100. See 462 F. Supp. at 1158-60.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1160.
103. See supra note 80 (discussing FLPMA's congressional veto and procedural
safeguards). Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (1994) (FLPMA's procedural safeguards),
with 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994) (Antiquities Act). For an estimate of the mineral values
in the Grand Staircase, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LAND
MANAGEMENT: ESTIMATES OF MINERAL VALUES AND OF THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
DEVELOPING MINERALS IN THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE NATIONAL MONUMENT
(GAO/RCED-97-117R, Apr. 17, 1997) [hereinafter GAO ESTIMATES].
104. See 143 CONG. REC. E2259, E2262 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997) (Legislative
Study and Investigative Staff Report on Abuse of Discretion in the Creation of the
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument under the Antiquities Act)
[hereinafter Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation].
105. Representative Hansen of Utah introduced H.R. 1745 on June 6, 1995. See
141 CONG. REC. H5622 (daily ed. June 6, 1995).
106. See Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2264-67
(setting forth e-mail correspondence between and among the President's Council on
Environmental Quality and the Department of Interior on consideration of the
Monument as a response to the threat to Utah wilderness lands). In an effort to
overcome a threatened veto and filibuster, H.R. 1745, the Utah wilderness bill, was
ultimately combined with a number of other public lands bills and debate on the
package began on Monday, March 25, 1996. See 142 CONG. REC. S2803 (daily ed.
Mar. 25, 1996) (amending H.R. 1296 to include various bills); see also 142 CONG. REC.
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The first concern of officials at the Council on Environmental
Quality ("CEQ")107 and the Interior Department was obtaining a
letter from President Clinton to Interior Secretary Babbitt,
requesting an investigation of and recommendation on which
Utah lands were suitable for monument designation.' Such a
letter, presumably, would fulfill the admonition of Alaska v.
Carter that to avoid NEPA, the Interior Department's
participation needed to result from a presidential request and not
from the agency's own initiative.0 9 As it turned out, the
President's signature was delayed until much later in the
summer,10 creating an argument, albeit a weak one, for those
who would later challenge the designation of the Monument that
the investigation was initiated by the Interior Department and,
therefore, that NEPA should apply."'
The President's signature may have been delayed in part
because the CEQ and the Interior Department were still debating
which Utah lands, if any, should be designated. In March, the
S273 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1996) (reflecting order on debate of bill).
107. The CEQ was established by NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1994).
In addition to issuing regulations implementing NEPA, the CEQ is charged with a
number of reporting and investigatory tasks relating to the quality of the
environment. See id. § 4344 (setting forth duties and functions of the CEQ). See
generally COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 19, at 10G.02[1] nn.3-4 (discussing role
of the CEQ).
108. See Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2264-67 (e-
mail correspondence).
109. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (discussing Alaska v.
Carter); see also Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2267
(April 25, 1996 e-mail from Sam Kalen to John Leshy, Dave Watts, and Robert Baum
stating: "As I recall, the advice we have given over the last couple of decades is that,
in order to minimize NEPA problems on Antiquities Act work, it is preferable to have
a letter from the President to the Secretary asking him for his recommendations.").
110. The President finally executed the letter requesting the Interior
Department's recommendation on August 7, 1996. See Majority Report on GS-ENM
Creation, supra note 104, at E2261. But see Utah Sch. & Institutional Trust Lands
Admin. v. Clinton, Civ. No. 97CV 492B at 40 (D. Utah filed June 25, 1997) (alleging
that the President never signed the letter).
111. In fact, this is one of the claims raised in the lawsuits protesting the
Monument's designation. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. It seems
unlikely to be successful for at least two reasons. First, the letter finally signed by
the President makes reference to a prior oral request to Interior Secretary Babbitt.
See Jim Woolf, First Option for Monument: Moab Monument Was Clinton Option,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 11, 1997, at B1 (quoting Kathleen McGinty of the CEQ that
the process was "initiated verbally" by President Clinton over the July 4 weekend).
Second, even if the Interior Department should have complied with NEPA, it seems
likely that the later request of the President is sufficient to ratify what had already
been accomplished.
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focus was on non-protected lands adjacent to Arches and
Canyonlands National Parks.112 By July, however, the focus had
shifted to the Kaiparowits Plateau, Escalante Canyons, and
Grand Staircase regions, which were adjacent to Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area, and which ultimately would be
designated as part of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument." 3  Unlike the lands adjacent to Arches and
Canyonlands, which were not endangered,1 4 in the case of the
Kaiparowits, the Administration could point to a reason for the
designation: Andalex, a Dutch-owned company, had federal coal
leases on the plateau that it was proposing to develop." 5 Indeed,
Andalex was well into the process of preparing its EIS. 1" 6 As the
Administration perceived it, the Monument could stop, or at the
112. See Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2265.
113. See id. at E2259, E2265-68.
114. See, e.g., id. at E2265 (March 25, 1996 e-mail from Kathleen McGinty to
J. Glauthier et. al. stating, "I'm increasingly of the view that we should just drop
these Utah ideas. We do not really know how the enviros will react and I do think
there is a danger of 'abuse' of the withdrawal/antiquities authorities especially
because these lands are not really endangered.").
115. See id. at E2268 (July 25, 1996 memorandum from Kathleen A. McGinty
to the President discussing the Andalex mine). The Administration's focus on
stopping the Andalex coal mine was, in fact, one of the arguments made by the Utah
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration that the Administration's use
of the Antiquities Act was illegitimate. They contended that the Administration's
real purpose was to stop development on the Kaiparowits and not to protect any
particular historic or scientific object. See Utah Sch. & Institutional Trust Lands
Admin. v. Clinton, Civ. No. 97CV 492B (D. Utah filed June 25, 1997); see also infra
Part II.A (discussing lawsuits against the Monument).
116. A copy of Andalex's 561 page Preliminary Draft Environmental Impact
Statement is contained in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON RESOURCES, 105TH CONG., 2D
SESS., MONUMENTAL ABUSE: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S CAMPAIGN OF
MISINFORMATION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE ESCALANTE
NATIONAL MONUMENT (Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter SECOND HOUSE RESOURCE
COMMITTEE REPORT ON GS-ENM CREATION].
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very least, hinder Andalex's development of the mine,117 thereby
protecting the Kaiparowits."'
2. The Department of the Interior's Reinventory of
Potential Utah Wilderness
During the same time that the Antiquities Act was being
considered as a response to the Utah wilderness debate, the
Department of the Interior came up with a second idea to thwart
the Utah delegation's wilderness proposal: it would conduct a
reinventory of potential wilderness in Utah."9 The idea was to
117. See Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2269
(August 14, 1996 memorandum from Kathleen A. McGinty to the President
discussing the opportunity to thwart Anadalex's coal development); see also id. at
E2271 (August 23, 1996 memorandum from Kathleen A. McGinty to the President
stating: "While a monument designation is not capable of stopping the mine (all
existing property rights and uses would be held harmless), it would make it more
difficult for the mining company to secure approval of their request for a 20 mile road
that they would propose to run across federal land, again in the heart of this area.");
Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-33 to 4-36 (discussing the effect of monument
designation on mineral development within a monument); infra Part II.B (discussing
the designation's potential impact on valid existing rights within the Monument).
118. See Bureau of Land Management, Remarks by the President in Making
Environment Announcement (visited on July 25, 1997) <http://www.blm.gov/nhp/
news/alerts/EscClint.html> [hereinafter President's Remarks] (I am concerned about
a large coal mine proposed for the area. Mining jobs are good jobs, and mining is
important to our national economy and to our national security. But we can't have
mines everywhere, and we shouldn't have mines that threaten our national
treasures."). The House Resource Committee has taken a different view than
President Clinton on whether the Andalex mine would have endangered the
Kaiparowits Plateau, noting that Andalex's Preliminary Draft Environmental Impact
Statement ('PDEIS") did "not list a single major impact associated with development
of the [Andalex mine] that would affect the list of 'environmental values' supposedly
protected by the designation of the Utah Monument." SECOND HOUSE RESOURCE
COMMITTEE REPORT ON GS-ENM CREATION, supra note 116, at 9 (comparing PDEIS's
findings of impact with proclamation's list of environmental values protected by
establishment of the Monument).
119. See Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2266
(March 29, 1996 e-mail from Linda Lance to T. Jensen et al. proposing a meeting at
the Interior Department where "[w]e'll push them on new wilderness inventory and
Kaparowitz/Escalante [sic]"). In fact, soon after this meeting to discuss a re-
inventory, Representative Hansen of Utah challenged Secretary Babbitt to perform
a re-inventory, arguing that until he did so, he had no basis for challenging the Utah
delegation's wilderness proposal. See Interior Department Review and Budget:
Oversight Hearing before the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 27 (1996)
(statement of Rep. Hansen).
All I am saying is to re-inventory it .... I keep hearing these comments
about all this additional acreage but I have yet to see the criteria; I have
yet to see the first acre of ground, Mr. Secretary, that says here is where
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reevaluate the 2.5 million acres of the 5.7 million acres of
wilderness claimed by conservation advocates that had not been
identified as WSAs by the BLM in its initial FLPMA section 603
inventory. 2 ° If those 2.5 million acres could be identified as
possessing wilderness characteristics, the Utah delegation would
no longer be able to use the BLM's 3.2 million acre figure as a
ceiling in the negotiation of potentially designable wilderness
areas.
Unsurprisingly, the Republicans in the Utah delegation were
strongly opposed to the reinventory, warning in a letter: "We
prefer to work with you to resolve this issue. However, if we
cannot work with you, then we will work against you at every
turn."'21  As far as they were concerned, the "threshold,
fundamental issue of how much BLM land has wilderness
characteristics" had already been answered. 22 If that "threshold"
inquiry still needed to occur, as suggested by the Interior
Secretary, what, they asked, had been the purpose of the entire
public inventory and appeal process conducted during the 1980s.
Such was the state of affairs on the eve of the Monument's
designation. The Utah delegation showed no signs of movement
toward the 5.7 million acre wilderness proposal preferred by the
Administration and was threatening to block any official effort to
it is .... [S]o rather than shouting at each other, why don't we just come
up with some work and find out where it is?
Id. When Secretary Babbitt actually announced the re-inventory, Representative
Hansen strongly objected, arguing that the re-inventory would be a waste of time and
money. See Jim Woolf, Did Bennett Seek to Kill Wilds Plan, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept.
7, 1996, at B1; see also infra notes 121-122 and accompanying text (discussing
opposition to re-inventory).
120. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing this issue).
121. Jim Woolf, As Babbitt Backs up, Utahns Say Back off Wilderness, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Aug. 2, 1996, at Al. But see supra note 119 (indicating that Rep. Hansen
had originally called for a reinventory).
122. Although Secretary Babbitt said that "no particular acreage target" had
been established, Woolf, supra note 76, at Al, there was little question that the
purpose of the re-inventory was to provide additional support for a larger wilderness
proposal, particularly because Babbitt had earlier admitted that he supported about
five million acres of wilderness. See Interior Department Review and Budget:
Oversight Hearing before the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 26-27 (1996)
("I believe from my own experience, from my knowledge, from the work of the land
specialists in this Department that there are in fact 5 million acres."); see also Jim
Woolf, BLM Experts Set to Reassess Wilderness, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 29, 1996, at
Bi (reporting the same).
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find out whether the disputed acreage even had wilderness
characteristics.123
D. The "Utah Event"
By the end of July 1996, it was apparent to the CEQ and the
Interior Department that their best opportunity for protecting
Utah's public lands was the Antiquities Act. One question
remained, and it was an important one given the election season:
how would the Monument play politically?'24 The answer given
to President Clinton by both his advisors and prominent
Democrats in the West was positive. 125  As they saw it, the
designation would "have particular appeal" in the urban areas of
the West where President Clinton had the best opportunity for
capturing votes, and would only hurt him in staunchly
Republican Utah and with rural constituencies that were unlikely
to vote for him in any event.1 26 Stopping the Andalex mine in
123. In any event, Utah supporters of the delegation's wilderness proposal were
not going to wait to find out what the results of the re-inventory would be. On
October 14, 1996, they sued Secretary Babbitt seeking an injunction against the re-
inventory. See generally Mike Gorrell, Lawmakers Have Tough Words for BLM, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Oct. 17, 1996, at A4. See also Jim Woolf, Utah Tells Babbitt: See You in
Court, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 15, 1996, at Al. The plaintiffs in the lawsuit were the
State of Utah, the Office of State Institutional Trust Lands Administration, and the
Utah Association of Counties. See id. On November 12, 1996, United States District
Judge Dee Benson granted an injunction prohibiting Babbitt from continuing the
wilderness re-inventory. See also Jennifer Toomer, Injunction Issued on Land
Inventory, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 13, 1996, at B1. See generally Jim Woolf, Utah
Prevails as Judge Halts Wilderness Study, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 16, 1996, at Al.
The injunction was later overturned by the Tenth Circuit. See Utah v. Babbitt, 137
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998).
124. See Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2268 (Aug.
5, 1996 e-mail from Kathleen McGinty to Marcia Hale suggesting that President
Clinton contact several important western Democrat officials and noting that "[tihe
reactions to these calls, and other factors, will help determine whether the proposed
action occur").
125. See id. at E2268 (Aug. 5, 1996 e-mail from Kathleen McGinty to Marcia
Hale suggesting that President Clinton contact Governors Roy Romer and Bob
Miller, former governors Mike Sullivan and Ted Schwinden, Senators Harry Reid
and Richard Bryan, and Representative Bill Richardson).
126. See id. at E2269 (Aug. 14, 1996 memorandum from Kathleen McGinty to
the President). Ms. McGinty informed the President that establishment of the
Monument
would help to overcome the negative views toward the Administration
created by the timber rider... create a compelling reason for persons who
are now disaffected to come around and enthusiastically support the
Administration.... [and] be popular nationally in the same way and for
the same reasons that other actions to protect parks and public lands are
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particular "would represent an immense victory in the eyes of
environmental groups.' 27
With political support lined up, the only thing left to do was
to schedule an announcement of the designation, what staffers
were now calling the "Utah Event,"'12 and to schedule it quickly
lest Utah's delegation get wind of the plan. In light of the amount
of staff work that had been done, and because of the President's
queries of western Democrats, Administration members were
acutely concerned someone might leak word of the designation.
129
Word finally did leak out on September 6, 1996, when the
Administration learned that the Washington Post planned to run
a story on the proposed designation.'30 Fearful that once the
Utah delegation learned of the proposed monument it would take
legislative action to block it,"' the Administration took two
actions. First, a firm date for the "Utah Event" was quickly
popular. The nationwide editorial attacks on the Utah delegation's
efforts to strip wilderness protection from these and other lands is a
revealing recent test of public interest in Utah's wild lands. In addition,
the new monument will have particular appeal in those areas that
contribute most visitation to the parks and public lands of southern Utah,
namely, coastal California, Oregon, and Washington, southern Nevada,
the Front Range communities of Colorado, the Taos-Albuquerque
corridor, and the Phoenix-Tucson area. This assessment squares with the
positive reactions by Sen. Reid, Gov. Romer, and Rep. Richardson when
asked their views on the proposal.
Id. In the actual event, the political advice was correct. Utah, a staunchly
Republican state, gave Bob Dole his highest margin of victory, with President
Clinton receiving only 33% of the votes compared to Dole's 54%. See Presidential
Vote: County by County, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 1996, at A6. Meanwhile, Arizona, New
Mexico, Nevada, California, Oregon and Washington all went for Clinton. See id.
127. Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2269 (Aug. 14,
1996 memorandum from Kathleen McGinty to the President). But see supra note 118
(discussing conflicting views on actual environmental impact of Andalex's proposed
mine).
128. Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2268-69 (e-mail
correspondence between CEQ staffers).
129. See id. at E2268 (Aug. 5, 1996 memorandum from Kathleen McGinty to
Marcia Hale stating that "any public release of the information would probably
foreclose the President's option to proceed"); id. at E2271 (Aug. 23, 1996 e-mail from
Kathleen McGinty stating that "we need to decide this soon, or I fear, press leaks will
decide it for us").
130. See id. at E2271 (Sept. 6,1996 memorandum from Kathleen McGinty to
the President: "We learned late today that the Washington Post is going to run a
story this weekend reporting that the Administration is considering a national
monument designation.").
131. See id. at E2271 (Sept. 6, 1996 memorandum from Kathleen McGinty to
the President: 'This [the Washington Post story] could lead the Utah delegation to
try efforts such as a rider on the Interior Appropriations bill next week to prevent
you from taking any such action").'
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scheduled.'32 In the meantime, the Utah delegation was told that
"no final decision on establishing a monument has been made."'33
In the end, the "Utah Event" was scheduled for Arizona.'
And, on September 18, 1996, the President stood before the
Grand Canyon and designated the Monument.' 35 Caught flat-
footed, the Utah delegation could do little except complain.'36 The
Administration had accomplished its objectives. It had produced
a powerful and appealing campaign event with the West's most
renowned natural landmark as a spectacular backdrop, and it had
outflanked the Utah congressional delegation on the wilderness
issue.
With respect to those lands within the new monument, the
Utah delegation had proposed designating only 403,169 acres as
wilderness and the Utah Wilderness Coalition had proposed
1,339,231 acres.'37 The Administration had gone even further,
designating 1.7 million acres as the Monument. In fact, because
almost 176,600 acres of Utah's school trust lands 3 ' were within
132. Apparently, by September 11 the event had been scheduled for the South
Rim of the Grand Canyon. See id. at E2259, E2271 (Sept. 11, 1996 e-mail of Tom
Kenworthy, Washington Post reporter, stating: "[S]outh rim of the grand canyon,
Sept. 18-be there or be square.").
133. See Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2272 (Sept.
13, 1996 letter from Interior Secretary Babbitt to Utah Senator Robert F. Bennett);
see also id. at E2260 ("[Tihe Utah Congressional delegation was being told by Ms.
McGinty and top CEQ staff on September 9 that no decision had been made and the
delegation would be consulted prior to any announcement."); id. (describing notes of
Sept. 16 meeting with Sen. Hatch of Utah).
134. The event was finally scheduled for Arizona apparently for a couple of
reasons. The President was campaigning there; logistically it presented fewer
difficulties than actually coming to Utah; and Secretary Babbitt had earlier advised
that making the announcement in Utah would "have the most confrontational of [sic]
'in-your-face' character." Id. at E2270 (Aug. 14, 1996 memorandum from Kathleen
A. McGinty to the President); see also supra notes 3, 126 (discussing political
advantages of making announcement in Arizona).
135. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
137. See State of Utah, School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration,
Map, Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument Trust Surface Ownership
(1997) (indicating the location and acreage within the Monument of the wilderness
proposals of the Utah delegation and the Utah Wilderness Coalition) (on file with the
author).
138. When Utah entered the Union in 1896, the federal government granted the
state four 640-acre sections out of each 36-square-mile "township" for use in funding
its schools. See Utah Enabling Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 6, 28 Stat. 109; Utah
v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 999-1000 (D. Utah 1979) (discussing Utah's school trust
lands).
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the Monument's boundaries, the area protected was actually
closer to 1.87 million acres.'39
Designating a national monument does not, of course, insure
the same level of protection as wilderness designation. The
permissible uses of a monument are within the discretion of the
designating President, although the President presumably would
abuse his discretion if he allowed uses of a monument
incompatible with "the proper care and management" of the
objects of "historic or scientific interest" that were to be protected
by the designation. 4 '
With respect to the Grand Staircase, President Clinton made
the typical presidential withdrawal of all federal land within the
Monument's boundaries from "entry, location, selection, sale,
leasing or other disposition under the public land laws," subject
to valid existing rights.' As a result of last-minute complaints
by Utah Governor Michael Leavitt and Utah's congressional
delegation, however, the President also made several
"concessions" relating to management and use of the
Monument.142 He agreed that Utah would continue to manage
the fish and wildlife within the Monument; that existing permits
for and levels of grazing would not be affected by the designation;
and that the designation would not create any federal reserved
139. Utah owned approximately 176,600 acres of land, as well as 24,165 acres
of mineral interests, within the exterior boundaries of the Monument. See H.R. 3830,
105th Cong. (1998). Because the school trust lands were interspersed with federal
lands, the pattern of property ownership within the Monument represented a
checkerboard. See State of Utah, School and Institutional Trust Lands
Administration, Map, Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument Trust Surface
Ownership (1997) (indicating the location of Utah's school trust lands within the
Monument) (on file with the author).
140. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994).
141. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223, 50,225 (1996).
142. The value of these "concessions" had been foreseen by Interior Secretary
Babbitt whose advice had been passed along to the President by Kathleen McGinty.
She proposed to the President:
[I]n establishing the monument, you take several steps to reduce short-
and long-term opposition from Utah's pro-development interests and
rural residents. First, he proposes that the BLM, rather than the
National Park Service, manage the monument. Second, he proposes that
you expressly disclaim any reservation of federal water rights for the
monument. Third, the Secretary has proposed monument boundaries
that exclude all developed areas and state park lands. Fourth, the
Secretary has proposed that the new management regime for the
monument area be defined through a multi-year public hearing and
involvement process.
Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2272 (Sept. 16, 1996
memorandum from Kathleen A. McGinty to the President).
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water rights.'43 Perhaps most interestingly, President Clinton
decided that the Grand Staircase would be the first national
monument managed by the BLM, an agency traditionally more
favorable to resource users and extraction interests.
14
The impact of these various concessions will take time to play
out and will become more evident once the Secretary of the
Interior completes a management plan for the Monument, due by
September 18, 1999.145 But whatever the concessions' impact, the
designation was a clear victory for preservationists. Some 1.7
million acres were protected from further entry and are still
143. See Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 24, 1996). These
last two concessions were not particularly remarkable. Any federal reserved rights
would have been subsequent in priority to existing water uses. See Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (reserved rights subject to prior appropriations).
And allowing grazing to continue as "governed by applicable law and regulations"
simply postpones the grazing issue to another day. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed.
Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 24, 1996). Grazing interests are not constitutionally protected
property interests and thus the "applicable law and regulations" allow grazing
permits to be limited or terminated by the BLM in the future. Id.; see infra note 166
(discussing the BLM's regulation of grazing); see also Robert B. Keiter, Defining a
Legal Framework for BLM Management, in VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE, supra
note 2, at 95-96 (discussing potential limits on grazing within the Monument). In his
speech at the South Rim of the Grand Canyon, President Clinton seemed to use
broader language than in the proclamation in describing what uses could continue,
promising that the Monument would "remain open for multiple uses including
hunting, fishing, hiking, camping and grazing." President's Remarks, supra note 118
(emphasis added); see infra notes 219-25 and accompanying text (discussing the
implications of this language). He also promised that the creation of the Monument
would "not come at the expense of Utah's children." President's Remarks, supra note
118. With respect to the 176,000 acres of state-owned school trust lands within the
Monument, he stated: "I have directed Secretary Babbitt to consult with Governor
Leavitt, Congressman Orton, Senators Bennett and Hatch to form an exchange
working group to respond promptly to all exchange requests and other issues
submitted by the state and to resolve reasonable differences in valuation in favor of
the school trust." Id. (emphasis added).
144. See generally George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson,
The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13
ENVTL. L. 1, 61-100 (1982) (discussing the history of rangeland management); George
Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, "Nothing Beside Remains" The Legacy of James
G. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law and Policy, 17 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473, 483 (1990) (The BLM's "main historical functions are
indicated by its derisory nickname, the 'Bureau of Livestock and Mining'" and by
observing that "[t]he agency has long been considered a model of the 'capture'
phenomenon because some of its operations essentially have been controlled by the
entities that the agency is supposed to regulate").
145. See Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223, 50,225 (1996). The BLM
recently published its Draft Management Plan. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT,
GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE NATIONAL MONUMENT DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT (1998).
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available for wilderness designation if they meet the necessary
criteria.146
II. THE LEGAL FALLOUT FROM THE GRAND STAIRCASE
DESIGNATION
Given the rancor with which the Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument was greeted, the unsurprising result of the
designation has been a number of legal disputes. This legal
fallout has manifested itself in four primary areas: first, in direct
challenges to the President's use of the Antiquities Act; second, in
.disputes about the extent and use of valid existing rights within
the Monument; third, in debate about the school trust lands
within the Monument and ultimately in their exchange for
federal lands; and fourth, in proposed legislation amending or
repealing the Antiquities Act. Although a thorough exploration
of each of these areas is beyond the scope of this article, a brief
overview is necessary to give context to the article's discussion of
the pitfalls of the withdrawal process employed in the case of the
Grand Staircase.
A. Challenges to the Withdrawal
In the two years since the creation of the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument, three lawsuits have been filed
alleging that President Clinton acted illegally in creating the
Monument.147 Although resolution of the cases will likely turn on
whether the withdrawal of the Grand Staircase was an
appropriate exercise of the Antiquities Act, each complaint states
a variety of causes of action. 4 ' They include unlikely claims
146. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a)(3) (1994) (noting that designation of wilderness
area within a national monument "shall in no manner lower the standards evolved
for the use and preservation of such.., monument").
147. See infra note 148 (listing the lawsuits).
148. For example, in its complaint, the Mountain States Legal Foundation
urges the court to declare that the actions of President Clinton, Secretary Babbitt
and the United States:
(1) violate the Antiquities Act because the President failed to "confine the
area to the smallest area compatible with the area to be protected"; (2)
violate the Antiquities Act because the President did not confine his
proclamation to "objects" of "historic" or "scientific" interest but included
general scenery and living organisms; (3) violate the Antiquities Act
because the President's designation was arbitrary and capricious; (4)
violate the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, because the
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under the Constitution, 149 FLPMA, 15 and NEPA. 151 The
powers exercised by Defendants exceeded the congressional grant of
presidential authority over federal lands; (5) violate the U.S.
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, because only Congress,
through the Property Clause, has authority to "make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States"; (6) violate [FLPMA] because Congress limited and
circumscribed the executive branch's withdrawal authority and that
limited power was exceeded; (7) violate FLPMA because Congress
expressly reserved all Wilderness Act decisions for itself and the
President's Monument designation includes Wilderness Study Areas
being considered by Congress and the President's Monument designation
constitutes "de facto" wilderness designation; (8) violate the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) because Defendants failed to follow
FACA requirements in establishing and chartering a federal advisory
committee and failed to provide notice and reasonable opportunity for
public participation; (9) violate the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section
9, Clause 7, because only Congress has the constitutional authority under
the Spending Power to obligate that money will be drawn from the
Treasury; and (10) violate the Anti-Deficiency Act because Defendant
Clinton's designation effectively reappropriated and diverted unexpended
appropriation balances for other than their original activities, which are
construed and accounted as new appropriations that increase the public
debt and violate the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Clinton, No. 97CV 0836G (D. Utah filed Nov. 5,
1997) at 3-4 (citation omitted); see also Utah School & Institutional Trust Lands
Admin. v. Clinton, Civ. No. 97CV 492B (D. Utah filed June 25, 1997) (making many
of the same claims and adding a claim under Utah's Enabling Act and the "equal
footing" doctrine); Utah Assoc. of Counties v. Clinton, Civ. No. 97CV 0479B (D. Utah
filed June 23, 1997) (stating causes of action under the Constitution, FLPMA, NEPA,
and the Antiquities Act).
149. The constitutional claims under the Property Clause are essentially
arguments that Congress improperly delegated its authority to the President in the
Antiquities Act. See supra note 148 (setting forth plaintiffs' claims). The
nondelegation doctrine, however, is essentially a constitutional dead letter. See
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 19, § 4.07 (reviewing nondelegation doctrine and
noting that "[the nondelegation doctrine fell into desuetude after the New Deal
when courts upheld even the broadest and vaguest of statutory delegations"). For
a court to hold that the Antiquities Act was an unlawful delegation would also put
in question FLPMA's delegation of authority to the Interior Secretary. See supra
note 80 and accompanying text (outlining FLPMA's withdrawal procedure).
150. The claims that the Grand Staircase designation violated FLPMA are also
a significant stretch. It is true that using the Antiquities Act to withdraw areas like
the Grand Staircase essentially swallows the withdrawal procedure of FLPMA. If
the President can use the Antiquities Act to withdraw as large an area as the Grand
Staircase primarily for scenic purposes, why would the President ever feel the need
to use FLPMA? But FLPMA expressly repealed 29 grants of executive withdrawal
authority, see Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2744, 2792 (1976), without
mentioning the Antiquities Act, despite the fact that the Act had been used to make
withdrawals similar to the Grand Staircase. See supra note 79. Under the basic rule
of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express inclusion
of one is an exclusion of another), it is simply difficult to read FLPMA as having
silently repealed the Antiquities Act. In fact, some might view this failure to repeal
the Antiquities Act as congressional acquiescence to prior interpretations of the Act.
See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (finding congressional
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Antiquities Act arguments have two prongs, both of which have
appeared in prior challenges to uses of the Act.
First, the plaintiffs argue that the President did not confine
his proclamation to objects of "historic" or "scientific" interest, but
instead included general scenery and living organisms. 15 2 This
contention is unlikely to succeed. It is essentially the same
argument rejected by the Supreme Court in Cameron and
Cappaert, where the Court decided that the Act would be given a
broad reading.'53 If the Grand Canyon was deemed an "object" of
scientific interest in Cameron, it is hard to see how the Escalante
Canyons, Kaiparowits Plateau, and Grand Staircase formation
would not be afforded the same status. 54  The arg-
acquiescence to executive withdrawals). But see infra note 311 and accompanying
text (questioning this assumption).
151. The NEPA claim also seems unlikely to succeed. Although the evidence
indicates that the Grand Staircase proposal was initiated by the Interior Department
and the CEQ rather than the President, see supra notes 104-18 and accompanying
text, the President's later involvement almost surely avoids the need for NEPA
compliance. He is not a federal agency; the Antiquities Act expressly commits the
withdrawal decision to his "discretion"; and nothing prevents him from picking up
an idea advanced by the Interior Department and running with it. Although the
Interior Department and the CEQ may have violated NEPA, see supra notes 97-102
and accompanying text (discussing Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Alaska
1978)), striking a legal presidential designation seems an unlikely remedy.
152. More specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the Interior Department pre-
determined the area they wished to see put off limits to development and then
"undertook searches of literature and information provided by environmental groups
to attempt to locate objects that could serve as a pretext for monument designation."
See Utah Sch. & Institutional Trust Lands Admin. v. Clinton, Civ. No. 97CV 492B
at 11-12 (D. Utah filed June 25, 1997); see also id. at 22-23 (describing the CEQ
"Project Liberty Checklist," which proposes development of a record to justify the
boundaries and lists "[p]ossibilities" for historic and scientific values to be protected).
153. See supra notes 87-88, 93-94 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's decisions in Cameron and Cappaert). Although the identification of objects
likely followed the identification of the land as plaintiffs suggest, see supra note 152,
it seems unlikely that sequence will be dispositive of the propriety of using the
Antiquities Act. As long as objects are eventually identified, and surely they were,
see infra note 156 and accompanying text, the protective designation is likely to be
upheld.
154. Some would surely disagree with this assertion. Many of the local
residents have argued, for example, that the Kaiparowits Plateau on which the
proposed Andalex mine site is located, "is the ugliest place in the whole monument."
Paul Larmer, Beauty and the Beast, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 14, 1997, at 9
(quoting Garfield County Commissioner Louise Liston); see id. at 10 (quoting Kanab
town councilman that "I've been out to the (Andalex) mine site regularly since 1988,
and I've never seen a backpacker on the Kaiparowits"); Brooke Adams, Most Utahns
Opposed to Designation, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al (arguing that
President Clinton did not "come to Utah where the monument is because the nation
would have laughed him out of office .... It's nothing but cow trails"); see also Mike
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ument is also unlikely to prevail because the proclamation
withdrawing the Monument was drafted by one of the country's
preeminent public lands scholars.155 It carefully covers each
potential ground for Antiquities Act withdrawal authority, 6
making it difficult to show that the President's actions were
.arbitrary and capricious.'57
The second argument that President Clinton's designation
violated the Antiquities Act is that 1.7 million acres was not "the
smallest area compatible with the proper care and management
of the objects to be protected." ' The plaintiffs contend that the
President's use of BLM jurisdictional boundaries makes clear that
his purpose was to protect land, not objects.'59 The difficulty with
this argument is again the standard of review. Even if plaintiffs
.can put forward a strong case that the Monument is larger than
Gorrell, Coal v. Cool! Does Beauty Outweigh Economic Value?; Escalante Area Is
Largely Untouched, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 18, 1996, at Al (noting that the
Kaiparowits is often described as "sterile" and "sparse"). Of course, the very sterility
and sparseness of the Kaiparowits is what wilderness advocates praise as an
opportunity for solitude and primitive recreation within the meaning of the
Wilderness Act. See Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994); supra note
35 (discussing the Wilderness Act).
155. The proclamation was drafted by Charles Wilkinson, a law professor at the
University of Colorado School of Law, at the request of Interior Solicitor John Leshy,
himself a public lands scholar from Arizona State University College of Law. See
Majority Report on GS-ENM Creation, supra note 104, at E2263.
156. See Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 24, 1996) (noting
that the monument "is a geologic treasure ... includes world class paleontological
sites," exhibits "extensive use ... by ancient Native America cultures ... is rich in
human history [and] is an outstanding biological resource," and expanding on each
issue in a separate paragraph). The description of "objects" within the Grand
Staircase is actually quite a bit more detailed than that of most other Antiquities Act
proclamations. See Proclamation No. 3887, 83 Stat. 920 (1969) (Arches National
Monument); Proclamation No. 3888, 83 Stat. 922 (1969) (Capitol Reef National
Monument).
157. See Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 894-96 (D. Wyo. 1945) (finding
that the President's designation of national monument will only be overturned if
arbitrary and capricious).
158. Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994).
159. One of the complaints pointed out:
The Monument's boundaries conform to the boundaries of the public land
managed by the BLM and previously studied for wilderness. The
Monument excludes all units of the National Forest System and the
National Park System, and stops at the Utah-Arizona border, even
though several of the so-called 'objects' to be protected-including the
Grand Staircase for which the Monument is named-are primarily
located in Arizona.
Utah Sch. & Institutional Trust Lands Admin. v. Clinton, Civ. No. 97CV 492B at 22
(D. Utah filed June 25, 1997).
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necessary, they likely will be unable to show that the President's
decision on Monument boundaries was arbitrary and
capricious."O In the end, there is little reason to think that the
history of judicial deference to presidential use of the Antiquities
Act will not repeat itself. The Monument should survive these
legal challenges.
B. Valid Existing Rights Within the Monument
In designating the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument, the President, of course, withdrew only federal lands
from further entry. State school trust lands and private lands
remained interspersed throughout the Monument. Moreover,
those federal lands that were withdrawn were "subject to valid
existing rights." '161 Thus, to the extent the Monument desig-
nation is upheld, the primary legal controversies will involve
disputes over the extent of these "valid existing rights" in federal
lands, and battles over access to state school trust lands and
private lands.
Making the withdrawal of federal land "subject to valid
existing rights" offers less protection to the holder of a right in
federal land than might initially appear. The reason is that the
existing rights are not absolute but subject to a variety of
restrictions. The right to operate a mine on federal land is not,
for example, unlimited. Prior to designation of the Monument,
the Secretary of the Interior was empowered to regulate mining
claims "to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation."'62 And, in
determining what constitutes unnecessary or undue degradation,
the Secretary was required to consider the character of the
surrounding area.'63 Moreover, for mining claims in wilderness
160. See Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 894-96 (setting forth arbitrary and capricious
standard of review); see also supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
161. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 24, 1996).
162. FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1994). Any mine that will disturb more than
five acres must also submit a plan of operations to the BLM for approval, see 43
C.F.R. § 3809.1-.4 (1998), and the plan will be approved only if it prevents
unnecessary or undue degradation and provides for reasonable reclamation. See id.
§ 3809.1-.6.
163. See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-.5 (1997) (suggesting that the Secretary should
consider "the effects of operations on ... resources and uses outside the area of
operations" and that "[w]here specific statutory authority requires the attainment
of a stated level of protection or reclamation ... that level of protection shall be
met"); see also Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming Forest
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.study areas, the claimants were generally prohibited from any
development that would impair the area's suitability for
designation as wilderness."' Federal mineral leases, grazing
permits, and other existing rights165 were likewise subject to a
variety of statutory and regulatory restrictions on use and
access.166 Finally, all existing rights were subject to additional
restrictions duly adopted in the future.
The Secretary of the Interior and the courts have thus
interpreted the same "valid existing rights" language in
FLPMA'67 to mean that the exercise of a valid existing right may
Service's decision not to allow motorized access to a mining claim in a wilderness
area), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1141 (1995).
164. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1994) (FLPMA section 603(c)). There are two
exceptions to this nonimpairment standard. First, FLPMA provides that "mining
and grazing uses and mineral leasing" may continue "in the manner and degree in
which the same was being conducted on October 21, 1976." Id. These grandfathered
activities are not subject to the nonimpairment standard, although they are still
subject to regulation "to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation." Id.; see also
Rocky Mtn. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 748-49 (10th Cir. 1982)
(interpreting section 603(c)); James N. Barkeley & Lawrence V. Albert, A Survey of
Case Law Interpreting "Valid Existing Rights"--Implications for Unpatented Mining
Claims, 34 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 9-1, 9-36 (1988) (discussing section 603(c)).
The second exception enunciated in FLPMA was for valid existing rights. See 43
U.S.C. § 1701(h) (1994) (protecting valid existing rights). Thus, those valid existing
rights not covered in the grandfather provision of section 603(c), for example R.S.
2477 rights-of-way, are not subject to the non-impairment standard. See Sierra Club
v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1086-87 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds, Village
of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970, 972 (10th Cir. 1992).
165. A valid existing right is a property interest in federal land that can take
a number of forms, including:
(1) public land entries leading to acquisition of title, such as mining
claims, homesteads, and trade and manufacturing sites; (2) leases and
licenses that do not lead to acquisition of title, including mineral leases;
(3) rights-of-way, easements and other forms of servitudes against the
United States; (4) public land grants to the states; and (5) severed estates
from federal ownership, such as severed mineral estates.
Barkeley & Albert, supra note 164, at 9-7 (footnotes omitted).
166. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1752(e) (1994) (allowing adjustments to grazing use);
43 C.F.R. § 4110.3-.3(b) (1998) (same); 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (1994) (noting conditions
for terminating a grazing lease); Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 185(h) (1994)
(requiring a plan for rights of way that controls or prevents "damage to the
environment (including damage to fish and wildlife habitat)"); 30 U.S.C. § 207(c)
(1994) (requiring an operation and reclamation plan for any coal lease that "might
cause a significant disturbance of the environment"). See generally COGGINS &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 19 (overview of various regimes governing resources on
federal land).
167. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(h) (1994) ("All actions by the Secretary concerned
under this Act shall be subject to valid existing rights."). The same protection of
valid existing rights appears in the Wilderness Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(c),
1133(d)(3) (1994). In fact, over 100 statutes in the United States Code employ the
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be restricted by applicable statutes and regulations, as long as
the restriction does not "make economic development completely
unprofitable":16 essentially, as long as it does not constitute a
Fifth Amendment taking.169 And as arduous as it is to succeed on
a regulatory takings claim for private land, 7 ° it is even more
difficult where the federal government owns the underlying fee
title. 1 In the end, therefore, the "valid existing rights" language
term "valid existing rights." See Barkeley & Albert, supra note 164, at 9-6 n.7.
168. Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1011 (D. Utah 1979).
169. See id. at 1011 ("[Sluch regulation cannot be so restrictive as to constitute
a taking."). There is some tension in the law with respect to just how far the
Department of Interior may go in regulating a valid existing right. Solicitor Krulitz's
initial opinion on this issue emphasized that regulation of valid existing rights was
bounded only by the requirement that they not be condemned or taken. 86 Interior
Dec. 89, 116 (1979). This opinion was later modified by the opinion of Solicitor
Coldiron who emphasized that restrictions on a valid existing right "may not be so
onerous that they unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the benefit of the right."
88 Interior Dec. 909, 913 (1981). Depending on the gloss given to the term
"unreasonably," this standard could prohibit some forms of regulation that would not
constitute a taking, namely a regulation that interfered with enjoyment of the right
but did not go so far as to "make economic development competitively unprofitable,"
Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 1011, as is typically required for a taking. See infra note 170
(discussing how regulation will typically not constitute a taking unless it works a
complete diminution in the economic value of the property). But see Stupak-Thrall
v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1270 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Moore, J., concurring)
("All authorities are in agreement that the 'subject to valid existing rights' language
was essentially designed to restrain agencies from effecting a taking."), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 764 (1997).
170. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.)
("[11f regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."). Unfortunately, the
task of determining when a regulation goes too far is difficult to pin down. Although
it is impossible in a footnote to capture the nuances and exceptions that are
pervasive in takings law, it is generally accurate to say that if a regulation results
in a physical invasion of property, it is almost surely a taking. See Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). On the other hand,
where there is no physical invasion, a regulation will not result in a taking if it
"substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests," that is, if the regulatory means
are sufficiently related to the regulatory ends, and if it does not "den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); see also Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987). Even if the property owner can show that a
particular regulation works a complete diminution in the economic value of his
property, the regulation will not be a taking if it is consonant with "background
principles" of state nuisance and property law. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the
Correct Spin on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411 (1993) (exploring implications of Lucas
decision and this so-called "nuisance exception").
171. The Supreme Court has emphasized that property rights on public land
are more susceptible to qualification because the United States maintains "broad
powers over the terms and conditions upon which the public lands can be used,
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probably does more to protect the federal treasury than rights
holders. The language ensures that the withdrawal itself will not
be construed as a taking, but allows a variety of restrictions to
avoid degradation or impairment of the lands within the
Monument.'72
School trust and private lands within the Monument also are
potentially subject to important restrictions because the
development of such lands often requires access across federal
land. The federal government is likely obligated to provide access
to school trust lands.17 3 The access, however, may be regulated to
protect federal interests as long as the restrictions are not so
"prohibitively restrictive as to render the land incapable of full
economic development.' '174 Access to private inholdings is more
leased, and acquired." United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104-05 (1985). Indeed,
because the background principles of federal law include such "broad powers" over
federal land, see id., the so-called nuisance exception of Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029, is
more likely to apply, making a takings claim even more difficult. See supra note 170
(discussing Lucas). For an overview of takings law in the public lands context, see
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 19, §§ 4.03-.05. See also id. § 4.03 (noting that
"a compensable taking of private property rights in a public natural resource has
been and most likely will continue to be exceedingly rare").
172. Understood in this light, the rights holder might be better off, in many
cases, if the withdrawal purported to eliminate her valid existing rights because just
compensation would be available. This is not to say that the holder of a valid
existing right is no better off than if she had no right at all. Although the right
holder's use or access may be restricted to the point of making development
unattractive, see supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text, an agency might well
be reluctant to impose severe restrictions because a court may view the restrictions
as going too far and working a taking, or it may even find that the restrictions violate
the more generous standard of unreasonable interference "with enjoyment of the
benefit of the right." See supra note 169 (discussing this standard which seems to
prohibit regulations in addition to.those which would act as a taking). For an
overview of the valid existing rights issue, see Robert B. Keiter, Defining a Legal
Framework for BLM Management, in VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE, supra note
2, at 93-96 (discussing potential impacts of valid existing rights within the
Monument); Barkeley & Albert, supra note 164; David Deisley, Valid Existing
Rights: Legal and Practical Realities, 44 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming
1998).
173. See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1011 (D. Utah 1979) (holding that
the federal government must allow access to a state school section in a wilderness
study area, but must not allow that same construction to impair the area's potential
wilderness characteristics). Andrus is the only case to have directly addressed the
issue of a guaranteed right of access across federal land to school trust lands,
although its result seems eminently reasonable in light of the purposes underlying
school trust lands. See generally COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 19, § 10E.03
(discussing state access to landlocked state lands).
174. 486 F. Supp. at 1010.
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complex.1 5 If the inholding is along an R.S. 2477 right-of-way,
1 7 6
access is available but subject to regulation. 177 If not along an
R.S. 2477 right-of-way, the inholder will likely need to apply to
the BLM for a right-of-way. Under FLPMA, the BLM can choose
not to grant the right-of-way 17 or to impose restrictions that will
"minimize damage to scenic and aesthetic values and fish and
175. As one treatise notes:
The law of access to inholdings thus is fragmented and uncertain.
National Forest inholders have a right of access according to one
interpretation of the ANILCA, but owners of lands within the other land
management systems apparently have no statutory rights. The means
of access to inholdings in all systems are subject to reasonable regulation
at a minimum.
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 19, § 10E.04[5]
176. R.S. 2477 rights-of-way are the product of a provision of the Mining Law
of 1866, which stated that "the right of way for the construction of highways over
public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." An Act Granting the
Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and for Other
Purposes, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (codified as Rev. Stat. § 2477 (1873))
(recodified as 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1938)), repealed by Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744, 2793 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1701 (1994)). This self-executing grant promoted construction of highways
across public lands, primarily by local governments and private individuals, by
assuring a vested right to any highway constructed. FLPMA repealed this open-
ended grant of rights-of-way over public lands, but explicitly protected R.S. 2477
rights-of-way in existence at the time FLPMA was passed. See 43 U.S.C. § 1769(a)
(1994). R.S. 2477 rights-of-way have been a source of significant dispute in the West
because their existence allows access for development and diminishes the
opportunity to designate wilderness, which requires 5000 roadless acres. See supra
note 35 (discussing wilderness criteria). See generally COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 19, § 10E.05[2][b] (reviewing R.S. 2477 right-of-way issues). Illustrative of this
debate is the recent dispute over proposed R.S. 2477 regulations by the Department
of the Interior. The existence and scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way has long been
considered a matter of state law. See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir.
1988). But, in 1994, the Interior Department proposed regulations that would have
established uniform standards and a process to determine the existence and location
of R.S. 2477 claims. See 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216 (1994). Congress, in turn, imposed a
moratorium on the regulations, and then passed legislation forbidding new
regulations unless approved by Congress. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); Mitchell R. Olson, Comment, The
R.S. 2477 Right of Way Dispute: Constructing a Solution, 27 ENVTL. L. 289, 291 &
n. 13 (1997) (discussing the moratorium and providing citations).
177. Holders of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way have access but that access is still
subject to regulation by the land management agency within whose jurisdiction the
right-of-way is located. See Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522, 1538-39 (9th Cir. 1994)
(affirming the Forest Service's refusal to allow motorized access along an R.S. 2477
right-of-way to an unpatented mining claim). See generally Philip F. Schuster, II &
Roger F. Dierking, Future Prospects for Mining and Public Land Management: The
Federal "Retention-Disposal" Policy Enters the Twenty-First Century, 26 ENVTL. L.
489 (1996) (discussing Clouser and the history of access to mineral claims).
178. See 43 U.S.C. § 1761 (1994).
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wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the environment." '179 Thus,
in most cases, even in the absence of direct federal regulatory
authority over land use, the BLM will be able to limit activities on
land within the Monument by restricting or conditioning access
to that land.
Controversy over existing rights within the Monument has
centered on the rights of two corporations: Andalex Resources
Inc., the Dutch-owned coal company whose federal coal leases
were specifically singled out by President Clinton as a reason for
establishing the Monument,18 0 and Conoco, owner of fifty-nine
federal mineral leases within the Monument.8 Andalex, which
held seventeen federal coal leases within the Monument covering
about 35,000 acres,'82 had approached Utah in 1989 with a
proposal to develop and mine coal on the Kaiparowits Plateau. 83
Utah estimated that the project would create up to 599 jobs with'
an associated payroll of $16.7 million annually.' It also
estimated that the school trust fund would receive approximately
$18 million in royalty payments over the thirty-year life of the
mine. ' Although environmental groups and the Clinton Admin-
istration argued rather persuasively that these figures were
"significantly inflated," ' 6 the figures, along with estimates of
179. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a)(ii) (1994) (setting forth the terms and conditions under
which the Secretary may permit a right-of-way over BLM lands).
180. See supra note 118 (quoting President Clinton's remarks about Andalex's
proposed coal mine); see also SECOND HOUSE RESOURCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON GS-
ENM CREATION, supra note 116.
181. See Brent Israelsen, Conoco Stakes Four Claims in Monument, SALT LAKE
TRIB., June 11, 1997, at B1.
182. See GAO ESTIMATES, supra note 103, at 3. The only other coal lease within
the Monument was held by PacifiCorp which before the Monument was designated
had already begun negotiations with the BLM to exchange the lease for credits to be
used in bidding on other federal coal leases. See id.
183. See id. at 6. The Kaiparowits reserves had been known for a number of
years but had been considered too remote to mine profitably. With the construction
of a large coal export depot at the Port of Los Angeles, 550 miles by train, profitable
production appeared feasible. See Frank Clifford, Kaiparowits: To Mine or Not to
Mine?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 9, 1996, at A4.
184. See GAO ESTIMATES, supra note 103, at 7-8 (citing 1993 Report of
Governor's Office of Planning and Budget). The Governor's office also estimated
"that state and local tax revenues from the proposed mine would total about $108.4
million over the life of the mine." Id.
185. See id. at 9 (citing Report of Governor's Office of Planning and Budget).
186. See id. at 19 (Department of the Interior's comments to report). An
especially trenchant criticism of Utah's figures on Kaiparowits coal came from
Interior Solicitor Leshy: "The marketplace has spoken pretty loudly on the value of
this coal. I mean, their trillions of dollars of coal numbers is like saying there are
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other mineral resources within the Monument," 7 indicate that
the economic impact of the Monument was not insignificant and
give insight into why local reaction to the Monument was so
negative. '
Andalex's plan was to begin mining coal in 1996, after a
three-year construction period.8 9 By the time the Monument was
designated, however, Andalex was still working on its EIS, having
already spent some $8 million in its preparation. 9 ° Although the
designation did not formally terminate Andalex's development
plans, the use and access restrictions likely to be imposed on
Andalex effectively ended its development plans. Thus, it was not
particularly surprising that soon after the Monument was
designated, Andalex stopped work on the EIS.191 Then, in
January 1997, it formally withdrew its mine application pending
trillions of dollars of gold in sea water." The News Hour with Jim Lehrer (PBS
television broadcast, Sept. 18, 1996), available in LEXIS, News Library, NEWSHR
file.
187. In 1997, the Utah Geological Survey estimated that the value of all energy
and mineral resources within the Monument ranged from $223 billion to $331 billion.
See GAO ESTIMATES, supra note 103, at 3 (reporting on estimates prepared by the
Utah Geological Survey and the Governor's Office of Planning and Budget).
188. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing local reaction to the
Monument). Tourist revenues will, of course, eventually replace some of the income
that would have come from mineral extraction, although many local residents are not
pleased with the notion of earning their wages in a service economy. See, e.g., Karl
Cates, Boon or Bane?, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 23, 1997, at B1 (discussing resident's
reaction to the trend away from extractive industry jobs and toward service and
trade jobs in Kane and Garfield counties); Lee Davidson, Land-Swap Deal Brings
Rare Accord, DESERET NEWS, May 19, 1998, at B1 (comments of Kane County
Commissioner); Brandon Griggs & Brent Israelsen, Painted Land, Colorful People;
A Year Later, Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument Slowly Unfolds, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Sept. 14, 1997, at J1 (discussing how residents of Boulder, Utah do not
want their town "to become 'another Moab'-a less-than-complimentary term
meaning congestion, overtaxed infrastructure and uncontrolled growth of motels,
condos and fast-food chains"); see also Sarah F. Bates, Public Lands Communities:
In Search of a Community of Values, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81, 103-04 (1993)
(discussing how communities based on resource extraction can resent the transition
to a recreation/tourism-based economy). The local residents have already benefitted
from some federal funding to be used for planning purposes. See infra note 284 and
accompanying text (discussing this funding).
189. See GAO ESTIMATES, supra note 103, at 6. The proposed underground
mine was to have produced about 75 million tons of coal over 30 years. See id. The
mine site was to have included office and warehouse buildings, coal-storage and
truck-loading facilities and a sediment pond. See id.
190. See SECOND HOUSE RESOURCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON GS-ENM CREATION,
supra note 116, at 8.
191. See Mike Gorrell, It Appears the End Is Near for Andalex Mine Proposal,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 27, 1996, at B1.
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before the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, declaring that
the designation made development of the mine futile.'92 The
claim of futility was plainly directed at a takings argument, and
since withdrawing its application, Andalex has been negotiating
with the Department of the Interior to resolve the issue, most
likely by trading its coal leases for other federal assets.193
Unlike Andalex, Conoco decided to test its valid existing
rights. In February 1997, it announced plans to drill exploratory
wells within the Monument on two sites on the Kaiparowits
Plateau, one on state school trust lands and the other on federally
leased land. 94 Aware of the potentially crippling access
restrictions that could be imposed, Conoco proposed to drill on
sites adjacent to an existing county road. 195 By March, the Utah
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining had issued a permit for drilling
on the school trust lands, 96 and in July Conoco began drilling on
those lands. 97 Then, in September 1997, the BLM gave its
approval for Conoco to drill a well on the federally leased land. 98
192. See Jim Woolf, Andalex Gives up on Kaiparowits Mine, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Jan. 24, 1997, at Bi.
193. See id. In January of 1998, Andalex submitted to the BLM a report
estimating the fair market value of the mine at $59.5 million. See Jeff Barber,
Report Places Value of Grand Staircase Coal Mine at $59.5 Million, INSIDE ENERGY,
Jan. 19, 1998, at 13. The BLMl intends to engage in further negotiations with
Andalex after it reviews the company study or does one of its own. See id.
194. See Jim Woolf, Conoco Wants to Drill for Oil in Escalante Monument:
Grand Staircase May Hide Oil Reserves, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 12, 1997, at Al.
Conoco's federal lease granted it the "exclusive right to drill for, mine, extract,
remove and dispose of all the oil and gas (except helium) together with the right to
build and maintain necessary improvements thereupon for the [10-year] term." See
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 141 I.B.L.A. 85, 87 (1997).
195. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 141 I.B.L.A. at 87. The BLM
found that
50 miles of existing road will be improved, by blading and resurfacing, as
needed, and a 0.1-mile-long spur road from the existing road to the well
site will be constructed. The total surface disturbance will be 2.5 acres,
of which 2 acres was previously disturbed by oil and gas drilling in 1954
and coal exploration drilling in 1963.
Id.
196. See Jim Woolf, Southern Utah Drilling; Monument May Not Yield Coal, but
Oil Could yet Flow, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 28, 1997, at Al.
197. See Brent Israelsen, A Year Later, Grand Staircase-Escalante Issues
Simmer, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 14, 1997, at Al; Brent Israelsen, Conoco Poised to
Start Drilling, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 8, 1997, at B1.
198. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 141 I.B.L.A. at 86; BLM Okays
Conoco Oil Well in Utah Monument;Appeal Filed, PUB. LANDS NEWS, Sept. 18, 1997,
at 2.
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Environmental groups vigorously opposed both decisions. 99
Although state law did not allow them to challenge Utah's
decision,2 °° they did appeal the BLM's decision to the IBLA.2°1
They argued that no drilling should be allowed pending
completion of the Monument management plan in September
1999.202 They also made a garden-variety NEPA argument that
the BLM's environmental assessment was inadequate and that a
full EIS should have been prepared. 20 3  Both arguments were
199. See, e.g., Robert Redford, A Piece of 'God's Handiwork,'WASH. POST, Nov.
25, 1997, at A19 (op-ed opposing drilling); infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text
(discussing environmental groups opposition).
200. See Utah Admin. Reg. § R649-10 (1995) (detailing administrative
procedures of Board of Oil, Gas & Mining); Denise A. Dragoo & Ruth Ann Storey,
Utah's Oil & Gas Conservation Act of 1983, 5 J. ENERGY L. & POLy 49, 60 (1983)
(discussing adjudicatory proceedings before Board of Oil, Gas, & Mining); see also
Woolf, supra note 196 (noting that because Utah law does not allow a legal challenge,
members of the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance "are bombarding Conoco and its
Delaware-based parent company, DuPont, with angry telephone calls and letters").
201. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 141 I.B.L.A. 85 (1997); BLM
Okays Conoco Oil Well in Utah Monument; Appeal Filed, PUB. LANDS NEWS, Sept. 18,
1997, at 2 (reporting that several environmental groups, led by the Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, appealed the BLM's decision to the IBLA on Sept. 12, 1997).
202. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 141 I.B.L.A. at 87-88. Specifically,
the Sierra Club argued that under 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1(a) (1998), pending completion
of the management plan EIS, no action could be taken that would have an adverse
environmental impact or limit the choice of reasonable alternatives. See Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance, 141 I.B.L.A. at 89. The IBLA rejected the argument,
pointing out that the proposed federal action to be considered in the EIS was the
Monument management plan and not the Conoco application, and that, in any event,
the project would not "foreclose, or even compromise, any of the BLM's options for
managing the overall Monument." Id.
203. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 141 I.B.L.A. at 88. In a familiar
approach, the environmental groups argued that the BLM's environmental
assessment ("EA") had failed to account for a number of potential impacts and had
failed to consider reasonable alternatives. See id. at 89-93. The IBLA rejected the
various NEPA arguments as without merit, concluding that the environmental
groups had made "no showing that the approved activity, including improvement of
the access road, construction of the spur road, and an increase in industrial traffic,
will adversely affect any of the particular natural, historical, or other resources that
the Monument is designed to preserve or protect." Id. at 88. It is unfortunate that
such unlikely arguments about the adequacy of an EA and the need for an EIS are
not unfamiliar to NEPA litigation. See R. Timothy McCrum, NEPA Litigation
Affecting Federal Mineral Leasing and Development, 2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 7,
7-8 (1986) (criticizing dubious NEPA claims whose primary purpose is merely to
delay development). See generally WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVTL. LAW § 9.2 at 817-18
(2d ed. 1994) ("More than any of the other environmental statutes the ad-
ministrative and litigation history of NEPA must be written in large numbers:
hundreds of injunctions, thousands of cases, tens of thousands of impact statements,
hundreds of thousands of environmental assessments."). Of course, dubious uses of
NEPA are not limited to environmental groups. See generally Jonathan M. Cosco,
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dubious; and both were rejected by the IBLA.2 °4 In the end,
however, the failure of these claims did not matter. Conoco did
not find what it was looking for on the school lands and decided
to forego any drilling on the federal lease.2 °5
To this point, therefore, the Clinton Administration has not
needed to use all of its available legal tools to prevent
development within the Monument. Conoco found nothing and
the Andalex negotiations are ongoing. Quite possibly, however,
more contentious questions of access and use will arise in the
future." 6
C. Exchange of State School Trust Lands Within the
Monument
As noted above, at the time the Grand Staircase was
designated, Utah had approximately 176,600 acres of school trust
'lands and 24,165 acres of mineral interests within the
Monument.0 7 In light of the legal hurdles presented by access
and use questions,0 ' the best solution for Utah was to negotiate
an exchange of its school trust lands and mineral interests
for federal lands elsewhere in the state.20 9
Note, NEPA for the Gander: NEPA's Application to Critical Habitat Designations and
Other "Benevolent" Federal Action, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 345, 349 (1998)
(discussing how NEPA can be used as a tool for "delaying or even defeating critical
habitat designations and other environmentally benevolent federal actions").
204. See supra notes 202-03 (discussing these arguments and their rejection by
the IBLA).
205. See Jim Woolf, Cornco May Drill 2nd Well, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 19, 1997,
at B1.
206. In fact, in June 1998, Conoco applied for permits to drill three more wells
on state lands within the Monument. See Heather May, Conoco Applies for Permits
to Drill Three Wells in Escalante Monument Despite Previous Failure, SALT LAKE
TRIB., June 27, 1998, at D2. Under the recently agreed upon land exchange, see infra
Part II.C, these state leases are scheduled to become federal leases. See May, supra.
Conoco has stated that it has no immediate plans to drill but is acting to protect its
leases, thus causing some to suggest that Conoco's application has more to do with
drilling "the federal treasury" than drilling for oil. See id. (statement of Scott
Groene, spokesman for Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance).
207. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
208. See supra Part II.B. Utah had previously encountered difficulties in trying
to develop in-held lands. See generally Scott T. Evans, Comment, Revisiting the Utah
School Trust Lands Dilemma: Golden Arches National Park?, 11 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 347 (1991) (reviewing the controversy surrounding Utah's
proposals to market and develop in-held lands within Arches National Park).
209. The authority to exchange in-held school trust lands for other federal lands
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President Clinton promised precisely that, vowing "to accelerate
the exchange process" and "to resolve reasonable differences in
valuation in favor of the school trust."21 It was easy, however, for
Utahns to be skeptical of the hopes for negotiating an exchange.
Utah had been down this route before, and, in fact, had long been
attempting to negotiate an exchange of the state's in-held lands
for other federal lands not subject to the same development and
access restrictions.21' Disputes over valuation, however, had
prevented significant exchanges. 2 2 And in the case of the Grand
Staircase, Utah's valuation of its in-held lands was
extraordinarily high. The Utah Geological Survey had earlier
estimated that revenues to the school trust fund would range
from $1.4 billion to over $2 billion if all recoverable coal on the
is provided in FLPMA. See 43 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (1994).
210. President's Remarks, supra note 118. The President also directed
Secretary Babbitt to consult with Governor Leavitt and members of the Utah
congressional delegation to form a working group to respond promptly to all
exchange requests. See id.
211. In 1980, Utah Governor Scott Matheson had initiated Project Bold which
proposed to exchange 2.5 million acres of scattered school trust land sections for
other federally owned land concentrated in large land blocks. See UTAH DEP'T OF
NAT. RESOURCES AND ENERGY, PROJECT BOLD: ALTERNATIVES FOR UTAH LAND
CONSOLIDATION AND EXCHANGE (1982). Project Bold never came to fruition, in part
because of disputes over valuation of the state lands involved, but also because a
variety of interest groups opposed the exchange:
County officials [did not] want to lose their in-lieu payments from the
federal government. And stockmen [were] unsure if their grazing permits
[would] be perpetuated on state lands at comparable fees being charged
on federal lands. Environmentalists also opposed Project BOLD,
expressing "doubts about the state's desire to protect 'significant
environmental values' on federal lands obtained in a trade."
Evans, supra note 208, at 362 (citations omitted). Then, in 1993, Congress passed
legislation authorizing an exchange for most of the state's in-held lands within the
national parks, national forests, and Indian reservations in the State of Utah. See
Utah Schools and Lands Improvement Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-93, 107 Stat. 995
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 6902 (1994)). Few parcels, however, were ever exchanged,
again because the parties could not agree on an appropriate valuation for the lands.
See 144 CONG. REC. S5787-89 (daily ed. June 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch for
himself and Sen. Bennett describing valuation problems under Public Law 103-93).
Thus, at the time of the Grand Staircase designation, Utahns had little confidence
in the possibility of a land exchange. See Marjorie Cortez, Land Swap? Don't Hold
Your Breath, Utahn Says, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 18, 1996, at Al; Mike Gorrell, Plenty
of Questions-No Real Answers, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 19, 1996, at A4.
212. See supra note 211.
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trust lands were developed.213 The chance for an exchange
seemed small.
Despite the history of fruitless negotiations, in May 1998,
Interior Secretary Babbitt and Governor Leavitt of Utah
announced an agreement to exchange 363,000 acres of school
trust lands, including all the school trust lands within the
Monument, for $50 million and 145,000 acres of federal lands
elsewhere in the state.214 As part of the agreement, Utah's School
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") agreed
to drop a federal lawsuit seeking disestablishment of the Grand
Staircase." 5 The exchange was signed into law on October 31,
1998.216 It makes significant strides toward healing some of the
rifts caused by designation of the Monument, but it does not
answer some of the fundamental questions about the manner in
which the Monument was created, except perhaps by way of
exemplifying a better approach to public lands issues generally.
The article returns to that issue in Part III.E.
213. See GAO ESTIMATES, supra note 103, at 8. This estimate is not discounted
to net present value. See id. at 7 n. 16. For criticisms of this estimate, see supra note
186.
214. See Brent Israelsen, Utah, Feds Arrange a Land Swap, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
May 7, 1998, at Al; Hatch Brings School-Trust-Lands Bill to Senate, SALT LAKE
TRIB., June 10, 1998, at A16; Utah Land Exchange Bill Moving, PUB. LANDS NEWS,
June 19, 1998, at 3. In the swap, the federal government will receive most of the
school trust lands within the State's National Parks, National Recreation Areas,
Indian Reservations, and National Forests, as originally provided for in the Utah
Schools and Lands Improvement Act of 1993. See supra note 211 (discussing Public
Law 103-93). In addition to the $50 million, Utah will receive approximately 145,000
acres of valuable federal land in nine Utah counties containing, among other
developable resources, some 160 million tons of coal and 185 billion cubic feet of
natural gas. See Brent Israelsen, Leavitt to Sign Pact Today for Land Swap, SALT
LAKE TRIB., May 9, 1998, at D1.
215. See Hatch Brings School-Trust-Lands Bill to Senate, supra note 214, at
A16. The exchange also will settle the ongoing disputes regarding valuation of the
various school trust inholdings which Congress had previously designated for
exchange under the Utah Schools and Lands Improvement Act of 1993. See 31
U.S.C. § 6902 (1994) (codifying Pub. L. No. 103-93, 107 Stat. 995 (1993)); supra note
211 (discussing Public Law 103-93 and this valuation dispute).
216. See Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-335,
112 Stat. 3139 (1998); see also 144 CONG. REC. H5072 (daily ed. June 24, 1998)
(remarks of Rep. Hansen); 144 CONG. REC. S5788-90 (daily ed. June 9, 1998)
(statements of Sens. Hatch and Bennett of Utah on introduced bill).
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D. Legislation Emanating from the Grand Staircase
Designation
A final front of legal response to the Grand Staircase desig-
nation has been the introduction of federal legislation to repeal or
amend the Antiquities Act. Such legislative efforts in the wake
of a president's use of the Antiquities Act are hardly new.217 In
fact, after President Franklin Roosevelt's designation of the
Jackson Hole National Monument, Congress amended the Act to
exempt the State of Wyoming from any further designations.218
In response to the Grand Staircase designation, several
pieces of legislation have been introduced in Congress. Senator
Bennett of Utah introduced legislation seeking to codify the con-
cessions President Clinton made in his Monument designation.1 9
The bill, however, goes one step further and also requires that the
Monument be managed under principles of "multiple use and
sustained yield., 2" Although the multiple use language has been
billed as merely codifying the President's promises, 22' that
217. For an overview of prior legislative efforts to amend or repeal the
Antiquities Act, see Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-25 to 4-33.
218. See 16 U.S.C. § 431a (1994) ("No further extension or establishment of
national monuments in Wyoming may be undertaken except by express
authorization of Congress."). For an overview of Congress's efforts to repeal the
Jackson Hole National Monument designation, see Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-25
to 4-27. The Wyoming exemption simply added an additional process flaw to a
statute that already unwisely departed from important principles of public
participation and procedural fairness.
219. See S. 357, 105th Cong. (1997). See generally Jim Woolf, Bennett Puts
Clinton's Promises in Writing, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 25, 1997, at D1.
220. S. 357, 105th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (1997). For definitions of "multiple use" and
"sustained yield," the bill refers to FLPMA. FLPMA defines "multiple use" as "a
combination of balanced and diverse resource uses that takes into account the long-
term needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources
including, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife
and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical values." 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c)
(1994). It defines "sustained yield" as "the achievement and maintenance in
perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable
resources of the public lands consistent with multiple use." Id. § 1702(h). These
definitions of "multiple use" and "sustained yield" are, of course, quite elastic. That
elasticity is precisely what has allowed for so much resource development on the
public lands under the "multiple use" banner. See generally COGGINS & GLICKMAN,
supra note 19, § 16.01 (reviewing multiple use, sustained yield law); George C.
Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of 'Multiple
Use, Sustained Yield"for Public Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 229 (1982)
(reviewing history of multiple use management).
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conclusion is a stretch. In truth, the President's careful use of the
term "multiple use," a public lands term of art, in his speech at
the Grand Canyon222 was likely only an election-season shading
of what was otherwise a plain effort to eliminate multiple use in
the Monument area. If multiple use management were truly
employed within the Monument, it would allow mining,223 which
is precisely what President Clinton said elsewhere in his speech
that he wanted to prevent.224 The bill seems unlikely to achieve
passage.225
In addition to Senator Bennett's management bill, no less
than seven bills have been introduced in Congress seeking to
limit the President's power to designate national monuments.
Two of the bills are similar to the Antiquities Act amendment
that exempted Wyoming, in that they are merely a particular
representative's effort to avoid having his state's ox gored.226 One
bill provides for several minor adjustments to the Monument's
boundaries. 227 Four bills, in contrast, constitute broad attacks on
the Antiquities Act. The National Monument Fairness Act of
1997,228 introduced by Representative Hansen of Utah and
actually passed by the House,229 and a companion Senate bill of
the same name, introduced by Senator Hatch of Utah,23 ° would
221. See 143 CONG. REC. S1571 (daily ed. 1997) (statement of sponsor, Sen.
Bennett); Jim Woolf, Bennett Puts Clinton's Promises in Writing, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Feb. 25, 1997, at D1.
222. See President's Remarks, supra note 118 (promising that the Monument
would "remain open for multiple uses including hunting, fishing, hiking, camping
and grazing" (emphasis added)).
223. See supra note 220 (discussing multiple use principles).
224. See President's Remarks, supra note 118 ("[W]e can't have mines
everywhere, and we shouldn't have mines that threaten our national treasures.");
Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223, 50,225 (1996) (withdrawing all federal
land from "entry, location, selection, sale, leasing or other disposition").
225. If passed by Congress, the bill would surely be vetoed by President Clinton
because of its multiple use language, and, in any event, the bill has not made it out
of committee during the 105th Congress. See Bill Digest: Congress Research Service,
available in LEXIS, Legis library, BLTRCK file.
226. See Idaho Protection Act of 1997, S. 62, 105th Cong. (sponsored by Sen.
Craig) (exempting Idaho from the Act); H.R. 413, 105th Cong. (1997) (sponsored by
Rep. Hastings) (exempting Washington from the Act).
227. See H.R. 3909, 105th Cong. (1998) (sponsored by Rep. Cannon of Utah).
228. See H.R. 1127, 105th Cong. (1997); see also 143 CONG. REC. H8398 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1997) (Rep. Hansen's remarks on bill)
229. The bill was passed by the House on October 7, 1997. See 143 CONG. REC.
H8502 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997).
230. See S. 477, 105th Cong. (1997); see also 143 CONG. REC. S2563 (daily ed.
Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch introducing bill).
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require an act of Congress to establish any national monument
over 50,000 acres.231 Representative Chenoweth of Idaho also
introduced a bill requiring an express act of Congress to create a
national monument.232 A third approach was offered by Senator
Murkowski of Alaska. His Public Lands Management
Participation Act of 1997 provides for public notice and requires
compliance with all applicable federal land management and
environmental statutes. 233
In light of the history of failed efforts to repeal the
Antiquities Act and in the face of an almost certain presidential
veto, it is unlikely that any of these bills will become law. But
even if that is so, the legislation does a valuable service of
renewing the debate about the appropriate level of political
process and public participation in public lands decisions. It is to
that debate, and more generally to the question of an appropriate
ethic of public lands protection, that this article now turns.
III. LESSONS FROM THE CREATION OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE
In the wake of the various legal controversies engendered by
the designation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument, it seems appropriate to ask: was it the right thing to
do? As someone who has hiked its canyons with my children and
explored its treasures with my father, I admit to a strong
preference for its protection from significant development.2 4 But
231. See H.R. 1127, 105th Cong. (1997). As originally introduced, the maximum
acreage for presidential designation was 5000 acres but the bill was amended by the
House to allow designations of up to 50,000 acres. See 143 CONG. REC. H8413 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1997). The bill gives the President authority to designate only 50,000
acres per state per year. To the extent he exceeds that figure, he must solicit the
comments of the appropriate governor, and Congress must approve the proclamation
within two years by joint resolution. See H.R. 1127, 105th Cong. (1997).
232. See H.R. 596, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring a congressional act for any
national monument, regardless of size).
233. See S. 691, 105th Cong. (1997).
234. My own experience confirms Aldo Leopold's eloquent observation about the
value of wild lands:
What value has wildlife from the standpoint of morals and religion? I
heard of a boy once who was brought up an atheist. He changed his mind
when he saw that there were a hundred-odd species of warblers, each
bedecked like to the rainbow, and each performing yearly sundry
thousands of miles of migration about which scientists wrote wisely but
did not understand. No "fortuitous concourse of elements" working
blindly through any number of millions of years could quite account for
why warblers are so beautiful. No mechanistic theory, even bolstered by
mutations, has ever quite answered for the colors of the cerulean warbler,
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focusing on whether the many wonders of the Grand Staircase are
worth preserving ultimately fails to answer the question.
Whether protecting those areas was proper depends only partially
on the result, and at least as much on the way in which the result
was achieved. On that question, the debate is closer. This
portion of the article thus explores the question whether the
process by which the Grand Staircase was designated was
appropriate, or whether it needs to be changed.
As suggested, it is unlikely that the designation will be found
to have violated existing law.235 But that should not end the
inquiry into its suitability. If there is one thing legal history
teaches, it is that legality is not an adequate proxy for virtue.
Thus, in questioning whether the Grand Staircase designation
was "appropriate," this section of the article focuses not on
whether opponents of the Monument will prevail in court, but on
identifying the basic principles that should guide withdrawal
decisions and preservation advocacy more generally.
To identify the guideposts that should inform withdrawal
decisions, one need look no further than the principles that
should inform our interaction with wild lands once they are
protected. Drawing from wilderness literature, particularly from
Joseph Sax's thought-provoking exposition in Mountains Without
Handrails of what he terms the "preservationist position," and
Aldo Leopold's profound commentary in A Sand County Almanac
on ethical interaction with wild lands,236 the next part of this
or the vespers of the woodthrush, or the swansong, or-goose music. I
dare say this boy's convictions would be harder to shake than those of
many inductive theologians. There are yet many boys to be born who,
like Isaiah, "may see, and know, and consider, and understand together,
that the hand of the Lord hath done this." But where shall they see, and
know, and consider? In museums?
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAc 230-32 (Ballantine Books 1970) (1966).
235. See supra Part II.A. Two student notes have addressed the question of the
legality of the designation of the Monument. See Ann E. Halden, Note, The Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument and the Antiquities Act, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 713 (1997) (arguing that the designation was a proper exercise of the Antiquities
Act); Paul Veravanich, Note, The Propriety of President Bill Clinton's Establishment
of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 20 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y J. 2 (1996) (arguing that the President's use of the Antiquities Act was
permissible and beneficial to Utah's economy); see also Colin Foley, The Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument: Balancing Public and Private Rights in the
Nation's Lands, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 743 (1998) (reviewing miscellaneous
public land laws relating to the Monument's designation).
236. See SAX, supra note 16; LEOPOLD, supra note 234. For a general review of
MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS, see A. Dan Tarlock, For Whom the National Parks,
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article identifies the basic virtues that should govern our
interaction with wilderness-virtues such as sportsmanship,
deliberation, restraint, sensitivity to impact, and patient
woodcraft. It then explores whether the designation of the Grand
Staircase conformed to those virtues. Ultimately, if the value of
wilderness is its ability to teach, or at very least provide the
setting for, "redeeming" behavior,23 7 it simply will not do to
acquire that wilderness by anything other than application of the
same principles. Unfortunately, in the case of the Grand
Staircase, the very virtues that are properly extolled by
preservationists in advocating how man should interact with wild
lands seem to have been largely violated in their acquisition.
A. Virtuous Interaction with Wilderness
Although it would be difficult to articulate a specific
catechism of wilderness values, wilderness literature reflects
agreement on certain basic virtues that should govern our
interaction with wild lands. The overarching virtue described in
the literature is that "the chase, not the catching, is
paramount.""23 The actual result of any particular endeavor is
secondary to the endeavor itself. Thus, as Sax discusses, in
recreational literature on fishing, the common message is that the
joys of angling have little to do with catching fish. "Fishing is
most satisfying, not when it results in accomplishment of a set
task, but in refining us."239 The essence of mountaineering is not
simply summiting, but climbing by the appropriate method.24 °
34 STAN. L. REV. 255 (1981) (book review).
237. See SAX, supra note 16, at 103.
238. RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 247 (1967)
(describing William Faulkner's message in The Bear).
239. SAX, supra note 16, at 28 ("[T]he secret of fishing is to be 'content to not-
catch fish in the most skillful and refined manner.'" Id. (quoting ALBERT MILLER,
FISHLESS DAYS, ANGLING NIGHTS xiii (1971))); see also FROME, supra note 35, at 13
("The fisherman, rather than being concerned with the catch itself, focuses on the
challenge; even when fish are few and scattered, he finds rewards in the setting and
in his feeling of harmony with the flows of weather, wind, and water."). Thoreau's
comments in Walden are to the same effect. He laments that those who came to
Walden and did not catch any fish were disappointed, even though "they had the
opportunity of seeing the pond all the while. They might go there a thousand times
before the sediment of fishing would sink to the bottom and leave their purpose pure;
but no doubt such a clarifying process would be going on all the while." HENRY
DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 218 (The Heritage Press 1939) (1849).
240. See SAX, supra note 16, at 37 ("[I]n great mountaineering, the result, the
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Likewise, rafting a river is about more than just roaring to the
bottom of some predetermined route, led by a river guide who
handles the rafts and prepares gourmet meals. At its best, river
rafting involves a slower-paced exploration of the canyon where
the rafter encounters the wilderness rather than simply
controlling or overpowering it.241 Hunting is the same. It is not
enough simply to kill the prey. The hunt is most satisfying when
it relies on subtle woodcraft and is not overaided by technology.242
With respect to each wilderness venture, accomplishment is
not a function of conquest but of virtuous method. Wilderness
literature thus emphasizes the principle of understanding our
surroundings, as opposed to simply dominating them.
243
reaching of a summit, is of minor importance . . .the whole merit of the climb
depend[s] upon the way it was done, that is the method, behavior and mental
attitude of the climbers .... (quoting GALEN ROWELL, IN THE THRONE ROOM OF THE
MOUNTAIN GODS 147 (1977))); see also JON KRAKAUER, INTO THIN AIR 20 (1997)
("Getting to the top of any given mountain was considered much less important than
how one got there: prestige was earned by tackling the most unforgiving routes with
minimal equipment, in the boldest style imaginable."); LAURA WATERMAN & GuY
WATERMAN, WILDERNESS ETHIcS 208 (1993) ("A few years ago an Italian party used
helicopters to help them climb Mount Everest. The mountaineering world was
aghast. What was the object? Why not just build a gondola to the top?... [R]isk and
challenge is why climbers go to the mountains.").
241. See SAX, supra note 16, at 94-96 (advocating this subtler rafting experience
and describing the promotional literature of the many commercial rafting adventures
that claim to provide an almost resort-like experience).
242. See SAX, supra note 16, at 32-33; Ted Williams, The Baiting Game,
AUDUBON, May 15, 1997, at 28 (praising those "who enjoy hunting migratory birds
without bait-who take the time to read water, wind, and law; who can work a
circling drake pintail with a call, coaxing him down out of an icy autumn
dawn ... who have always believed that there can't be any thrill to the chase if there
is no chase"); THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE WILDERNESS HUNTER xv (1893) ("In
hunting, the finding and killing of the game is after all but a part of the whole" and
"[tihe free, self-reliant, adventurous life, with its rugged and stalwart democracy; the
wild surroundings, the grand beauty of the scenery, the chance to study the ways and
habits of the woodland creatures-all these unite to give to the career of the
wilderness hunter its peculiar charm."); id. at 19 ("Hunting in the wilderness is of
all pastimes the most attractive, and it is doubly so when not carried on merely as
a pastime. Shooting over a private game preserve is of course in no way to be
compared to it.").
243. See JOHN MUIR, THE EIGHT WILDERNESS DISCOVERY BOOKS 593 (1992)
("Nearly all my mountaineering has been done on foot, carrying as little as possible,
depending on camp-fires for warmth, that so I might be light and free to go wherever
my studies might lead."); FROME, supra note 35, at 13 ("The wilderness hunter,
learning the habits of animals and meeting the prey on its own ground, appreciates
the stillness, physical exercise, woodlore, the pride in roughing it, the kill that comes
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Similarly, the literature encourages avoiding undue impact on
wild lands244 and exercising self-restraint, most often by self-
limitation of technological advantage. As Aldo Leopold wrote:
Voluntary adherence to an ethical code elevates the self-
respect of the sportsman, but it should not be forgotten that
voluntary disregard of the code degenerates and depraves him.
Our tools for the pursuit of wildlife improve faster than we do,
and sportsmanship is a voluntary limitation in the use of these
armaments. It is aimed to augment the role of skill and
shrink the role of gadgets in the pursuit of wild things.245
Leopold's use of the term "sportsmanship" is perhaps as good as
any to describe the "ethical code" that should govern our
interaction with wild things. His message, and the message that
is pervasive in wilderness literature, is that relying on
experience, patient woodcraft, and subtle comprehension of one's
natural surroundings has a redeeming quality that is lacking
where the result is assured by technology or gadgetry.246
hard, rather than easy.").
244. See, e.g., FROME, supra note 35, at 97 ("All the outdoor clubs have been
deeply concerned and are developing various guidelines and codes of ethics for their
members. They urge wilderness travelers.., to try not to tread unnecessarily on
delicate plants that make up fragile alpine communities ... to respect the natural
environment and treat it gently."); U. S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV., U. S. DEP'T
OF INTERIOR NAT'L PARK SERV., AND U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, LEAVE "No TRACE" LAND ETHICS (1993) (" 'No Trace' guidelines have
been designed, to aid in the protection of all back country and wilderness areas. By
following these guidelines, we can better protect the land and lessen the sights and
sounds of our visit."); Jim Gorman, Leave No Trace: A New Wilderness Ethic,
BACKPACKER, Apr. 1998, at 68 (praising the federal wilderness "Leave No Trace"
program); GEORGE AND IRIS WELLS, THE HANDBOOK OF WILDERNESS TRAVEL 69-71
(Harper & Brothers 1956) ("Be so clean a camper that no one else can tell you have
passed this way.").
245. LEOPOLD, supra note 232, at 212; see also id. at 232 ("[T]he ethics of
sportsmanship is not a fixed code, but must be formulated and practiced by the
individual, with no referee but the Almighty."); SAX, supra note 16, at 15 (contending
that "self-restraint" is one of the values which preservationists believe interaction
with wild lands promotes).
246. See, e.g., SAX, supra note 16, at 32; id. at 37 ("Cimbing literature] affirms
the proposition that 'climbing with a few classic tools that become extensions of the
body is quite conducive to the sought-after feeling; using a plethora of gadgets is
not."' (quoting GALEN ROWELL,, IN THE THRONE ROOM OF THE MOUNTAIN GODS 111
(1977)); id. at 39 (suggesting that the purpose of setting forth rules for the "climbing
game" is "to conserve the climber's feeling of personal (moral) accomplishment
against the meaninglessness of a success which represents merely technological
victory" (quoting Lito Tejada-Flores, Games People Play, ASCENT 23-25 (1964))).
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B. Virtuous Acquisition of Wilderness and Public
Participation in the Withdrawal Process
At a broad level of abstraction, the key to virtuous interaction
with wild lands is an understanding that the method employed,
and not the result achieved, is what ennobles the participant.247
Because virtue generally should not be situational or geographic,
it is instructive to ask what this same principle implies for the
task of wilderness advocacy and acquisition. Translated into the
context of wilderness advocacy, the principle that accomplishment
is more a function of method than conquest suggests the necessity
of a fair withdrawal process. For disregard of due process in
withdrawing public lands devalues the withdrawal just as surely
as "disregard of the code [of wilderness virtues] degenerates and
depraves"24  the sportsman. But what exactly does a fair
withdrawal process entail?
A fair or-to borrow from Leopold-sportsmanlike with-
drawal process should, as an initial matter, allow for public
participation. Soliciting input from those connected to the land
emulates the wilderness virtue of seeking understanding rather
than domination.249 Such understanding, of course, has more
than an aesthetic purpose. Allowing public comment makes it
more likely that unforeseen benefits and detriments of any
withdrawal will be taken into consideration.25 ° With public
participation, those opposed to the withdrawal are more likely to
accept the result if they have had an opportunity to participate in
the development of the withdrawal proposal.2"' That the
247. See supra notes 238-46 and accompanying text. The same truth is
articulated by every parent who tells his or her little-leaguer, "it's not whether you
win or lose, but how you play the game." See also Mark 8:36 ("For what shall it profit
a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?").
248. LEOPOLD, supra note 234, at 212.
249. See supra note 243.
250. For a thorough discussion of issues surrounding public participation in
federal land management decisions, see Gail L. Achterman & Sally K. Fairfax, Public
Participation Requirements of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 21 ARIZ.
L. REV. 501 (1979). Increased public participation in federal land management
decisions was one of the key recommendations of the Public Land Law Review
Commission. See U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REV. COMM'N, supra note 78, at 57.
251. Public participation is not, of course, a panacea for resolving public lands
disputes. Sarah Bates has pointed out that "the typical public hearing is structured
to discourage the kind of dialogue necessary to reach consensus. Although plenty of
opportunity exists to speak and submit written comments, members of the public
may feel that their opinions are little more than chits on a tally sheet." Bates, supra
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withdrawal process should include public participation does not
seem particularly controversial. In fact, public participation in
western public lands decisions has been championed by Interior
Secretary Babbitt,252 Interior Solicitor Leshy,253 and the Clinton
Administration.254
note 188, at 91. Indeed, Achterman and Fairfax have suggested that the basic
assumptions underlying public participation-that public involvement will lead to
wiser decisions and greater acceptance by the public-are "largely unfounded." See
Achterman & Fairfax, supra note 250, at 507-08 (noting that public involvement
programs may actually "mobilize dissent and heighten polarization, public
frustration, and dissatisfaction"). Nevertheless, they conclude that the real need is
for the BLM to recognize the limitations of public involvement and to develop public
participation procedures that are more efficient. See id. at 532-38. Ultimately, it is
hard to argue that public involvement does not have limitations, but that fact should
not obscure that even inefficient and limited public participation is superior to no
participation at all.
252. See Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental
Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847, 858-59 (1982) ("The federal
government should share responsibility with the states in its capacity as landowner,
as well as in its sovereign capacity.... In particular, it has a responsibility to insure
that the interests of those with whom it shares the West are represented in the
decisionmaking process." (footnote omitted)); id. at 861. ("The states should have a
guaranteed voice in decisions that affect their future. Statutes and administrative
policies that allow for state concurrence with federal land use decisions will help to
achieve this goal.'); id. ("Both the states and the federal government share a common
trust: the public good. They ought to be collaborators rather than adversaries. By
working toward a truly cooperative regime of public land management, they may
improve both the public welfare and the health of the intergovernmental system.").
253. In 1995 Solicitor Leshy had stated:
A second theme [of the Clinton Administration] has been a healthy
respect for federalism. This cannot be a surprise from an administration
headed by a former governor and a state attorney general, whose DOI
Secretary has a similar background. But even apart from the shared
belief that not all public policy wisdom emanates from Washington, D.C.,
cooperative federalism is a policy and political necessity.
John D. Leshy, Natural Resources Policy in the Clinton Administration: A Mid-
Course Evaluation from the Inside, 25 ENVTL. L. 679, 681 (1995); see also John D.
Leshy, Granite Rock and the States'Influence over Federal Land Use, 18 ENVTL. L.
99, 114 (1987) (advocating federal agency preemption of some state regulatory
control over the public lands "if the federal agencies use a process that ensures state
interests are heard and accounted for").
254. For example, President Clinton stated:
This bill is the result of extensive negotiations by my Administration, the
Congress, and environmental and sportsmen's groups. Starting from
widely differing positions, they worked intensively to reach the
compromise reflected in this legislation. The bill is proof that when there
is a shared commitment to do what is right for our natural resources,
partisan and ideological differences can be set aside and compromises can
be negotiated for the benefit of the common good.... I hope and trust the
process by which this bill was enacted will serve as a model for future
congressional action on other environmental measures.
33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1535 (Oct. 9, 1997); see also Jerry Spangler, Monument
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Despite the general agreement on the virtue and value of
public participation, in the case of the Grand Staircase
withdrawal, the Clinton Administration worked assiduously to
avoid it, keeping the Monument plans secret up until the last
minute.255 Why did the Administration depart from the very
virtue it had preached as a necessity in other contexts? The
Administration's reply might be that the secrecy was necessary
because the Monument might have been derailed by notice of the
Administration's intentions.25 This claim seems dubious.
Although the political cost may have been higher, President
Clinton could have accomplished the withdrawal without keeping
it a secret.25 7 In truth, the argument that the designation may
have been derailed by public notice is only a claim that the
Administration could not have achieved its objective as easily.
The argument is akin to that of the occasional tourist who
demands roads in every wilderness area, because otherwise
access to various natural attractions would be difficult or time-
Sparks Accord, Shea Says, DESERET NEWS, Apr. 17, 1998, at B1 (BLM Director
Patrick Shea noting that resolution of environmental conflicts will only come through
a spirit of compromise that includes citizen participation from all sides of the debate
but stating that he does not see the lack of public participation in the Grand
Staircase designation "as a contradiction").
255. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
256. See 143 CONG. REC. 8398, 8412 (Oct. 6, 1997) (letter from Secretary Babbitt
suggesting that public notice would increase the chances that companies would stake
mining claims or carry out other development that could impair the ability of the
President to designate the Monument); Statement of John Leshy, Solicitor,
Department of the Interior, Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, Feb. 12, 1998 (1998 WL 8992137) (making this argument).
257. The notion that the President would have lost the ability to withdraw the
lands is something of a red herring. Some of the land in the Monument was already
protected by virtue of its wilderness study area status. See supra note 139 and
accompanying text (describing percentage of land within Grand Staircase identified
as WSAs); supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing protected status of
WSAs). Moreover, the Interior Secretary could have first proposed to withdraw the
lands under FLPMA and in his proposal segregated the lands from the operation of
the public land laws. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b)(1) (1994). Alternatively, the Secretary
could have used the emergency withdrawal provision of FLPMA to withdraw the
land for three years while the possibility of using the Antiquities Act was considered.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1994) (FLPMA emergency withdrawal provision); 43 C.F.R.
§ 2091.5-2093 (1998) (setting forth segregative effect of emergency withdrawal); see
also Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-39 to 4-40 (refuting idea that executive
withdrawal is necessary to act quickly to protect lands from threatened damage).
The availability of FLPMA's emergency provisions also makes dubious the claim that
the possibility of Andalex's mining was what made necessary reliance upon the
Antiquities Act. See also supra note 118 (discussing whether the Andalex mine was
as great a threat to the Kaiparowits Plateau as President Clinton suggested).
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consuming. Just as the absence of a road poses a difficulty but
promotes virtuous wilderness interaction,258 the process of public
participation is time consuming but results in a more thoughtful
and virtuous withdrawal.
The Administration might also reply that public participation
was unnecessary because the law, specifically the Antiquities Act,
did not require it.2 9  This claim is accurate but begs two
questions: should the Antiquities Act be repealed or amended;
and, in any event, should legal proscription be the only limit on
the withdrawal process? The article returns to both of these
questions below, answering the first in the affirmative and the
second in the negative.26 ° In the meantime, it is sufficient to say
that whatever the law requires, seeking input from those
attached to the land is a basic virtue that was largely disregarded
in the establishment of the Grand Staircase.261
C. Virtuous Acquisition of Wilderness and Respect for
Existing Communities
A fair or virtuous withdrawal process would not only include
opportunities for public input, but would actually weigh and
consider that input, particularly as it relates to the needs and
cultural heritage of existing communities. Achieving protected
258. See JOHN MUIR, THE EIGHT WILDERNESS DISCOVERY BOOKS 571 (1992)
("Little, however, is to be learned in confused, hurried tourist trips, spending only a
poor noisy hour in a branded grove with a guide. You should go looking and listening
alone on long walks through the wild forests and groves in all seasons of the year.");
SAX, supra note 16, at 79-80 (arguing that the purpose of reserving natural areas "is
not to keep people in their cars, but to lure them out").
259. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (explaining that Antiquities
Act designations do not require public notice).
260. See infra Parts III.D, III.E.
261. The Administration could perhaps also argue that public participation was
unnecessary because there had already been significant public input during the
congressional debates on the Utah wilderness bill and before that on the FLPMA
section 603 process. See 143 CONG. REC. H8283 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1997) (remarks of
Rep. Miller of California making this argument); John D. Leshy, Putting the
Antiquities Act into Perspective, in VISIONS OF THE GRAND STAIRCASE, supra note 2,
at 86-87 (Interior Solicitor Leshy's articulation of this argument); see also supra Part
I (discussing Utah wilderness wars). But the participants in that debate did not
have an opportunity to address the impacts and benefits of all the specific lands
designated within the Monument, and the essence of due process is to be informed
of the precise action government might take. Moreover, as discussed below, even if
the President thought he knew the entire debate, public participation has important
purposes beyond educating the decision maker.
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status for public lands is, at very least, a disquieting victory if the
withdrawal simply leaves existing communities in its wake,
alienated and struggling to stay afloat.
Mountaineering literature's concerns about recent Mount
Everest expeditions are an apt metaphor for such disquieting
victories. In the rush to scale the world's highest peak,
unqualified climbers use professional guides,26 2 caution is thrown
to the wind, and the mountain itself is- abused, littered with
empty oxygen canisters, abandoned gear, and, more and more of
late, bodies.263 Everest, mountaineering's highest achievement,
has become a symbol for the trophy recreationist who cares
nothing for method as long as he can point to achievement.264 A
withdrawal process that focuses on the size of the withdrawal to
the exclusion of the interests of local communities is little
different. In truth, it is much like trophy hunting: as long as the
achievement can be figuratively placed on the nation's mantle,
the impact 265 or purpose266 of the hunt matters little.
267
262. See Rod Nordland, The Gods Must Be Angry, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1997,
at 45 (describing the guided tours up Everest and a base camp "cushier than ever,
supplied by daily chopper flights, with video movies and propane heaters in some of
the tents. The Malaysians even had Coca-Cola packed in by Sherpas, while camp
caterers cranked out bagels, pizza and sushi"); see also KRAKAUER, supra note 240
(describing the 1996 Mount Everest disaster in which a number of climbers on
professionally guided trips died when caught in a storm near the summit); id. at 23.
("Traditionalists were offended that the world's highest summit was being sold to
rich parvenus-some of whom, if denied the services of guides, would probably have
difficulty making it to the top of a peak as modest as Mount Rainier.").
263. See Bhola Rana, Money Hitch to Clean up Everest, BERNAMA, May 15,
1998, available in 1998 WL 6598208 (quoting Nepal officials that one clean-up
expedition brought back two tons of rubbish and that "[w]e will probably have to
mount two expeditions to clear the mountain of empty oxygen cylinders, human
bodies and even remains of a crashed Italian helicopter"). In truth, the clean-up
problem has been lessened in the last few years due to the efforts of several
expeditions to bring down trash, although much remains to be done. See KRAKAUER,
supra note 240, at 60, 161 (describing these recent efforts).
264. Aldo Leopold describes the "trophy-recreationist" as a person who "must
possess, invade, appropriate." LEOPOLD, supra note 234, at 267-68; see also JOHN
STEINBECK & EDWARD F. RICKETTS, SEA OF CORTEZ: A LEISURELY JOURNAL OF TRAVEL
AND RESEARCH 166 (1971) ("We have never understood why men mount the heads of
animals and hang them up to look down on their conquerors. Possibly it feels good
to these men to be superior to animals but it does seem that if they were sure of it
they would not have to prove it.").
265. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing how minimizing
impact on nature is consistently emphasized in wilderness literature).
266. Hunting literature is replete with the argument that hunting is most
virtuous and fulfilling when it is done for the purpose of obtaining sustenance. See,
e.g., ROOSEVELT, supra note 242, at 19 ("Among the hunts which I have most enjoyed
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There was certainly an element of trophy hunting in the
Grand Staircase designation. As Leopold wrote: "A peculiar
virtue in wildlife ethics is that the hunter ordinarily has no
gallery to applaud or disapprove of his conduct. Whatever his
acts, they are dictated by his own conscience, rather than by a
mob of onlookers. 268 Contrast this "peculiar virtue of wildlife
ethics" with the overemphasis on political benefit that
characterized the deliberations leading up to the designation of
the Grand Staircase. 2 9 The very structure of the Antiquities Act
allows the President to act as "dictated by his own conscience,"
yet the President seemed more concerned about the "mob of
onlookers." It is for this same reason that there was something
discouraging about the President making his proclamation at the
Grand Canyon rather than in the Canyons of the Escalante. The
gallery would certainly have been less, but standing on the
quieter and more remote lands of the Grand Staircase would have
been a powerful symbol of why conscience, not politics, demanded
their protection. Perhaps the detour to a remote area of Utah is
a lot to ask during the hectic period of a presidential campaign,
but the whole message of wilderness is that the quiet and
deliberate is to be valued over the noticeable and expedient.
Recognizing the importance of the impact of public lands
decisions on local communities should also be understood as a
manifestation of another insight of wilderness literature:
were those made when I was engaged in getting in the winter's stock of meat for the
ranch, or was keeping some party of cowboys supplied with game from day to day.");
George Reiger, As Others See Us: How Are Sportsmen Really Perceived by Others...
And What Can We Do to Improve the Image?, FIELD AND STREAM, Apr. 1996, at 19
(citing a survey by Yale psychologist Stephen Kellert finding that "while 85 percent
of the public accepts hunting when it's done for meat only, the approval rating drops
to 64 percent when 'recreation' is mentioned as a supplemental motive for going
afield," and that, "half the people polled ... strongly opposed hunting if it's primarily
done for 'sport,' and 82 percent objected if its sole purpose is a trophy").
267. Decrying the growth of trophy hunting, one recreation author stated:
Recently, however, some hunters have overstepped the bounds of
friendly competition and redefined deer hunting as an outright trophy
quest in which nothing-not circumstances, effort, luck, or
coincidence-matters more than score. If this year's rack doesn't rack up
more points than last year's, the hunt was a bust. That's a frightening
attitude, really, and blatantly disrespectful to the animal.
Doug Pike, The True Measure of a Buck, FIELD AND STREAM, June 1998, at 13. The
quest for more wilderness acreage should not become like the never-ending quest for
the larger buck.
268. LEOPOLD, supra note 234, at 197.
269. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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civilization is not an evil imposition on the good of wilderness.
Rather, as Robert Marshall, founder of The Wilderness Society,
put it, preservation decisions precipitate a conflict "between
genuine values."2 '  The "remedy" to that conflict, suggested
Henry David Thoreau, "is to be found in the proportion which the
night bears to the day, the winter to the summer, thought to
experience." '271 In the end, it is civilization that makes possible
the savoring of wilderness and wilderness that makes possible the
appreciation of civilization.272
Ultimately, the task in public lands decision making is to find
a balance between the competing benefits of wilderness and
civilization. Leopold expressed this effort to find a balance this
way:
What I am trying to make clear is that if in a city we had
six vacant lots available to the youngsters of a certain
270. NASH, supra note 238, at 205 (quoting Robert Marshall, The Universe of
Wilderness Is Vanishing, 29 NATURE MAGAZINE 240 (1937)). Elsewhere, Marshall
noted that "[t]he world ... cannot live on wilderness, except incidentally and
sporadically." SAx, supra note 16, at 43 (quoting ROBERT MARSHALL, ALASKA
WILDERNESS 165 (1973)). This same sentiment has been expressed by numerous
other wilderness writers. See, e.g., NASH, supra note 238 (tracing the tension
between wilderness and civilization from its roots in the conflict between the
Enlightenment and Romanticism and between Puritanism and Primitivism); Mark
Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 226-44 (1974)
(discussing same). I suspect that most of us have both romantic and neoclassical
inclinations. We esteem ordered beauty suggestive of man's intellectual and artistic
prowess but also prize tangled, complex beauty suggestive of the vastness,
complexity and sublimity of nature.
271. NASH, supra note 238, at 92 (quoting Walking, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
HENRY DAVID THOREAU 258 (1893)).
272. This insight is proffered by Roderick Nash in his superb book Wilderness
and the American Mind. See supra note 238. There, he comments on a passage in
Sigurd Olson's book, Listening Point:
Its eighteenth chapter, "The Whistle," described his thoughts on hearing
the sound of a distant locomotive while camping alone. Initially, Olson
recalled, he was greatly disturbed at the intruding sound. But after it
had passed, he reflected on the whistle as symbol of civilization. '"Without
that long lonesome wail and the culture that had produced it, many
things would not be mine-recordings of the world's finest music, books
holding the philosophy, the dreams and hopes of all mankind, a car that
took me swiftly... whenever I felt the need." Moreover, it was ultimately
civilization that made possible the appreciation of wilderness .... "Only
through my own personal contact with civilization," Olson concluded,
"had I learned to value the advantages of solitude."
NASH, supra note 238, at 230 (quoting SIGURD OLSON, LISTENING POINT 150-53
(1958)). Nash quotes the similar insight of an anonymous poet: "Gregarious man
has a lonesome soul/And wilderness ways lead back to a crowd." Id. at 229 (quoting
Anonymous, Nothing More?, in 2 LIVING WILDERNESS 24 (1946)).
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neighborhood for playing ball, it might be "development" to
build houses on the first, and the second, and the third, and
the fourth, and even the fifth, but when we build houses on
the last one, we forget what houses are for. The sixth house
would not be development at all, but rather it would be mere
short-sighted stupidity.273
With respect to public lands preservation, the difficulty, of course,
is deciding what constitutes the sixth lot, and indeed, whether
development of the first five lots is even necessary.
Suggesting that the impact of withdrawal on local
communities be considered and balanced against the benefits of
withdrawal should not be understood as an argument that the
public lands must be managed for the benefit of local
communities. That was long the approach of the Forest Service,
which managed the national forests with the explicit objective of
protecting the stability of surrounding resource-dependent
communities;2 74 and historically it was largely the approach of the
BLM 1 5  Instead, the consideration of impact should be
understood as a focus on how those public lands deserving of
protection can be preserved with the least possible negative
impact on local communities. Approaches to protecting local
communities27 have been explored by a number of writers, 7 and
273. ALDO LEOPOLD, ALDO LEOPOLD'S WILDERNESS 159 (David E. Brown & Neil
B. Carmony eds., 1990).
274. See Bates, supra note 188, at 92-93 (outlining and discussing the Forest
Service's community stability management objectives); Con H. Schallau & Richard
M. Alston, The Commitment to Community Stability: A Policy or Shibboleth?, 17
ENVTL. L. 429, 434-50 (1987) (discussing history of community stability policy under
Forest Service); see also Sustained Yield Forest Management Act of 1944, ch. 146,
§ 1, 58 Stat. 132 (stating its purpose to "promote the stability of forest industries, of
employment, of communities, and of taxable forest wealth, through continuous
supply of timber").
275. See generally George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson,
The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13
ENVTL. L. 1, 41-100 (1982) (discussing the history of rangeland management).
276. Although the article uses the term "community" in its geographic and
political sense as referring to those towns and counties in close proximity to the
public lands to be withdrawn, the term "community" is capable of broader definition.
See Bates, supra note 188, at 82'85 (1993) (identifying a variety of different public
lands communities, including geographic communities and communities defined by
a shared sense of identity).
277. See, e.g., Diane M. Dale, The Boundary Dilemma at Shenandoah National
Park, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 607, 608-14 (1997) (reviewing the creation of Shenandoah
National Park and the forced removal of park land inhabitants); Joseph L. Sax,
Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of Water, 1 WEST-
1999] UTAH'S GRAND STAIRCASE
by Congress, which, for example, has passed legislation providing
rural communities disadvantaged by National Forest
management decisions with financial and technical assistance to
aid in the diversification of their economies."' A thorough
examination of potential strategies for protecting local
communities is beyond the scope of this article. But the one
theme common to the approaches for easing the blow suffered by
local communities from public land management decisions is that
the community and its interests should at the very least be
included in the decision-making process.279
N.W. 13 (1994) (discussing the need to recognize community interests in water
transfers); Bates, supra note 188; Joseph L. Sax, The Trampas File, 84 MICH. L. REV.
1389 (1986) (setting forth a proposal by the New Mexico Society of Architects that the
northern New Mexican village of Las Trampas be incorporated into the national park
system and setting forth competing viewpoints); Joseph L. Sax, Do Communities
Have Rights? The National Parks as A Laboratory of New Ideas, 45 U. PITT. L. REV.
499 (1984) (raising a number of provocative questions about preservation of
agricultural village of Boxley Valley within the Buffalo National River unit of the
National Park System); Daniel S. Reimer, Comment, The Role of "Community" in the
Pacific Northwest Logging Debate, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 223 (1995) (describing the
"unique" Northwest logging community and suggesting the necessity of including
that community in the forest policy dialogue); see also Schallau & Alston, supra note
274, at 429 n.1 ('There is, perhaps, no more sensitive issue for public land
administering agencies to consider than how management decisions affect people
who live near or are dependent on resource-based activities." (citation omitted)).
278. See National Forest-Dependent Rural Communities Economic
Diversification Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 2371, 104 Stat. 3359 (codified at
7 U.S.C. § 6611 (1994)); Bates, supra note 188, at 99-100 (discussing this legislation
and other legislation designed to assist rural communities in transition from a
resource dependent economy); see also id. at 97-98 (describing the Community
Stability Act of 1991 which was never enacted but which would have "required
federal land planning to consider outputs, demands, employment, and local
government receipts, and would have restricted reductions in public land outputs
greater than ten percent below the average output for the previous five years"); id.
at 98 (describing Northwest Forest Protection and Community Stability Act of 1991,
H.R. 3263, 102nd Cong., which was not enacted but which would have aided the
economic transition of resource-dependent communities by providing federal grants);
Schallau & Alston, supra note 274, at 452-66 (reviewing public land legislation
addressing community stability).
279. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 277 (calling for cooperative land planning
efforts); Reimer, supra note 277, at 241-42 (arguing that under principles of group
autonomy Northwest timber communities should have the right to participate in
decisions that affect their future); Bates, supra note 188, at 104-11 (advocating broad
community involvement in land management decisions). See generally Symposium,
The Ecosystem Approach: New Departures for Land and Water: Practical Legal Issues
for Community Initiated Ecosystem Management of Public Lands, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q.
iii, 745-97 (1997); Timothy P. Duane, Community Participation in Ecosystem
Management, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 771 (1997) (investigating the Quincy Library Group
forest management plan).
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Despite the general agreement on the virtue of considering
impact on local communities as part of the withdrawal process,
the Clinton Administration gave little heed to the communities
surrounding the Monument. The chase was secondary to the
capture. Although it drew boundary lines to exclude the local
communities, it did little else prior to the Monument's creation to
involve the communities. No public hearings were held. No input
was sought from state and local government officials. And no
guidance from local federal land managers was sought. °
Ignoring the communities had predictable results. On the
technical level, a number of clumsy boundary errors resulted.2
More significantly, the communities' sense of alienation from the
federal government and relative sense of helplessness at
controlling their destinies were severely exacerbated. 28 2 Most
predictable of all, supporters of the Monument in the local
communities were very few.2 8
Since designation of the Monument, the Administration has
done much more to address the impact on the local communities
and win them over to the Monument. It has offered funding to
Kane and Garfield counties for planning in conjunction with the
Monument. 84  The BLM has sought broad input in its
280. See 143 CONG. REC. S2563 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Hatch: "Without any notification, let alone consultation or negotiation, with our
Governor or State officials in Utah, the President set aside this acreage .... There
was no consultation, no hearings, no town meetings, no TV or radio discussion shows,
no nothing."). The Administration did, however, consult with two Utah ecologists
employed by the United States Geological Survey regarding monument boundaries
and did consider local community impact in rejecting the ecologists' suggestion that
the monument be extended 30 miles westward to link up with Zion National Park.
See Jim Woolf, Experts Envisioned a Staircase to Zion, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 26,
1998, at Al. Secretary Babbitt believed that such an extension was likely to make
"the monument even more unpopular to people in Kanab and [in] nearby
communities along U.S. 89." Id. The Administration's primary consultations,
however, were with certain environmentalists and Democratic party politicians in
the West. See supra notes 5, 125.
281. For example, the boundaries encompassed a producing oil field, acreage
where one town had planned to expand its high school athletic field, the wells and
water storage facilities of another town, and part of one property owner's driveway
to his ranch. See Lee Davidson, Measure Calls for Changes in Staircase Boundaries,
DESERET NEWS, June 7, 1998, at A22.
282. See supra note 8 (newspaper articles revealing frustration and alienation
of the local communities).
283. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (describing local opposition to
the Monument).
284. Kane County accepted some $200,000 in federal money. See Paul Larmer,
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preparation of a management plan for the Monument.285 And as
discussed above, Secretary Babbitt and Governor Leavitt
negotiated the exchange of federal land elsewhere in Utah for
state school trust lands within the Monument.286 These post-
designation efforts should help ease the sting of the lack of pre-
designation process, but they are a poor substitute. Because of
.the inertia engendered by an existing proclamation, foregoing
community involvement until after designation makes it more
likely that reasonable community needs will not be met. It also
ensures the sort of acrimony and alienation that make
cooperative management particularly difficult. But even if
including the community in the designation process had no
demonstrable benefits, it would be the right thing. Careful
deliberation does not always yield fruit and sometimes hasty
mistakes can be repaired by subsequent action, but that does not
mean that deliberation is not wise, or indeed virtuous.
Why in the case of the Grand Staircase did the Clinton
Administration fail to involve the local communities in
considering the potential impact on them? Presumably because
under the Antiquities Act it was not obligated to do so.
Withdrawal decisions typically require consideration of the
interests of local communities. FLPMA's withdrawal provisions
require the Secretary of the Interior to publish notice of any
proposed withdrawal, conduct public hearings, and consult with
local government bodies.28 7 Along with the notice, the Secretary
Beauty and the Beast, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 14, 1997, at 8. Of that amount,
$100,000 had been offered to Garfield County but refused as "blood money." Id.
285. See Bureau of Land Management, How You Can Participate in Planning
for the Monument (visited July 18, 1998) <http://www.blm.gov/nhp/news/alerts/
Esc1PubPart.html> (describing public involvement process); see also Keiter, supra
note 143, at 92-93 (describing Monument planning process).
286. See supra Part II.C. This exchange presumably will be of greater benefit
to SITLA than it will be to those counties who lost school trust lands in the exchange.
287. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b)(1) (1994) (requiring publication of notice in federal
register); id. § 1714(c)(2)(7) (requiring consultation with "local government bodies,
and with other appropriate individuals and groups); id. § 1714(h) (requiring a public
hearing). For a more thorough overview of FLPMA's withdrawal procedures, see
supra note 80 and infra note 288. The Wilderness Act also provides for public notice
and public hearings in the areas in the vicinity of the affected land. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1132(d)(1)(A), (B) (1994). NEPA also potentially requires some concern for impact
on local communities in its commitment to preserving "important historic, cultural,
and natural aspects of our national heritage." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (1994)
(emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(g) (1997) (listing among consequences
of agency action to be considered "[u]rban quality, historic and cultural resources,
and the design of the built environment"); 40 C.F.R § 1508.27(b)(8) (1997) (a finding
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must furnish Congress a detailed report on the proposed
withdrawal, a significant portion of which must address the
withdrawal's impact on local communities."' The Antiquities
Act, of course, is different. Just as it requires no public notice, it
requires no consideration of local impact." 9 If consideration of
impact on local communities is truly an important principle of a
fair withdrawal process, the question posed earlier is presented
again: should the Antiquities Act be amended or repealed? It is
to that issue that the article now turns.
D. Amending the Antiquities Act in Keeping with
Wilderness Virtues
One of the clear lessons of the Grand Staircase designation
process is that it is time for a legislative change. As discussed in
of "significance" depends in part upon adverse impact on cultural or historical
resources). Generally, however, the impact on "culture" will not include socio-
economic impacts on a local community. See 7 C.F.R. § 3100.42 (1997) (defining
"cultural resources" as "the remains or records of districts, sites, structures,
buildings, networks, neighborhoods, objects, and events from the past").
288. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2) (1994). The report requires the Secretary to
address twelve different issues, among which are the following:
(2) an inventory and evaluation of the current natural resource uses
and values of the site and adjacent public and nonpublic land and how it
appears they will be affected by the proposed use, including particularly
aspects of use that might cause degradation of the environment, and also
the economic impact of the change in use on individuals, local
communities, and the Nation;
(3) an identification of present users of the land involved, and how
they will be affected by the proposed use;
(4) an analysis of the manner in which existing and potential
resource uses are incompatible with or in conflict with the proposed use,
together with a statement of the provisions to be made for continuation
or termination of existing uses, including an economic analysis of such
continuation or termination ....
(6) a statement as to whether any suitable alternative sites are
available (including cost estimates) for the proposed use or for uses such
a withdrawal would displace; ,
(7) a statement of the consultation which has been or will be had with
other Federal departments and agencies, with regional, State, and local
government bodies, and with other appropriate individuals and groups;
(8) a statement indicating the effect of the proposed uses, if any, on
State and local government interests and the regional economy;
(i0) the time and place of hearings and of other public involvement
concerning such withdrawal;
(11) the place where the records on the withdrawal can be examined
by interested parties.
Id. § 1714(c) (emphasis added).
289. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994).
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Part II.D, in the wake of the designation, four bills29° were
introduced in Congress seeking either to eliminate29 ' or severely
limit292 the President's authority to proclaim a national
monument, and to revest the authority to create national
monuments primarily with Congress. The approach of these bills
has much to recommend it. It is consonant with the
Constitution's provision that Congress, and not the executive
branch, "shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." '293 It more closely adheres to the
FLPMA withdrawal process, which generally governs the
withdrawal of public lands.29 4 And the bills would increase the
fairness of the national monument withdrawal process by
providing opportunities for public participation and consideration
of local community impacts.295
Balanced against these benefits is the unfortunate reality
that if the President's withdrawal power were repealed, protective
withdrawal of public lands would likely decline.29 6 The reason is
290. See supra Part II.D (discussing legislation emanating from the
designation).
291. See S. 691, 105th Cong. (1997) (providing that "a recommendation of the
President for declaration of a national monument shall become effective only if so
provided by an Act of Congress"); H.R. 596, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring an act of
Congress for any national monument).
292. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text (describing bills of Sen.
Hatch and Rep. Hansen, which respectively require an act of Congress to establish
any national monument of more than 5000 or 50,000 acres).
293. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. For an argument in favor of repealing the
Antiquities Act, see Johannsen, supra note 77 (contending that the act should be
amended consonant with the land withdrawal policies articulated in FLPMA).
294. See supra notes 287-88 (discussing FLPMA withdrawal process). For an
argument in favor of repealing the Antiquities Act, largely because it violates
FLPMA's basic withdrawal approach, see Johannsen, supra note 77, at 457-65. See
also Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-39 to 4-42 (articulating a number of arguments
for repeal of the Antiquities Act).
295. The bills proposed by the Utah congressional delegation do not explicitly
provide for public participation or consideration of impacts on local communities.
They require only that the Secretary of the Interior consult with and obtain written
comments from the governor of the state in which the monument is to be located. See
H.R. 1127, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 477, 105th Cong. (1997). Plainly, the governor is
more likely to understand and consider local interests but there is no express
requirement of public participation. The bill of Senator Murkowski, by contrast,
explicitly requires the Secretary of the Interior to provide opportunities for public
involvement and to comply "with all applicable federal land management and
environmental statutes." S. 691, 105th Cong. (1997).
296. See generally Getches, supra note 77 (discussing vast amount of public
lands afforded protected status by executive action).
550 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
fairly obvious. A President's use of the Antiquities Act can be
thwarted only if congressional opponents are able to move a bill
through Congress, overcoming potentially antagonistic committee
chairmen who could bottle-up the bill and procedural obstacles
like Senate cloture rules, and then obtaining the super-majority
necessary to override the likely presidential veto. By contrast, if
a particular representative in Congress has the same
preservation intention, the very procedural barriers that protect
the President's withdrawal from repeal become hurdles that the
representative potentially must overcome.
For those of us who prefer more preservation of the public
lands, the obvious impact of repealing the Antiquities Act makes
it tempting to defend the status quo, to argue that the Act should
abide unamended and frequently employed.297 But defending the
Act is an uncomfortable task because, as discussed, to defend the
Act's failure to provide for public participation and consideration
of impact on local communities is, in some measure, to betray
basic wilderness values of sportsmanship and sensitivity to
impact. Defending an act whose primary value is as a tool to
circumvent Congress and its panoply of procedural obstacles is
also troubling when weighed against analogous wilderness
values.
As mentioned, included in the general principle that it is
method, not conquest, which ennobles wilderness endeavors, is
Leopold's insight that as "tools for the pursuit of wildlife improve
faster than we do," the sportsman should make "a voluntary
limitation in the use of these armaments ... aimed to augment
the role of skill and shrink the role of gadgets in the pursuit of
wild things."29  Other preservation and recreation literature
widely echoes the point that patient reliance on woodcraft
elevates wilderness ventures, whereas over reliance on tech-
nological advantage diminishes their value.2 99
297. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. H8282-84 (Oct. 1, 1997) (comments of Reps.
Miller and Hinchey in opposition to H.R. 1127, which propose amendment of
Antiquities Act); H.R. REP. No. 105-191, at 9-10 (1997) (dissenting views on H.R.
1127); Shepherd, supra note 78, at 4-39 n.195 (discussing opposition to amendment
or repeal of Antiquities Act).
298. LEOPOLD, supra note 234, at 212; see supra notes 245-46 and accom-
panying text (discussing this issue).
299. See, e.g., ABBEY, supra note 14, at 14 ("There's another disadvantage to the
use of the flashlight: like many other mechanical gadgets it tends to separate a man
from the world around him."); FROME, supra note 35, at 102 ("Even the best
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Participation in the democratic process can be understood as
a type of woodcraft. Pushing a preservation bill through Congress
is not an easy task. It requires careful planning, committed
sponsorship, navigation of procedural pitfalls, persuasive and
thoughtful advocacy, and, more often than not, compromise. For
these reasons, the legislative tool is not particularly efficient and
sometimes does not work, although its efficiency and efficacy do
increase with the experience and persuasive ability of the wielder.
If democracy can be analogized to woodcraft, then the discomfort
with the Antiquities Act is that it seems something like a
wilderness acquisition gadget. Because the woodcraft of
legislation is arduous and the results may not be as dramatic, we
turn to the Antiquities Act for surer satisfaction. The
unfortunate irony is that by doing so, the satisfaction of
preservation advocacy is actually diminished because it loses
some of its nobility. Doing the hard legislative work of persuasion
to "the preservationist position" is surely more ennobling than
conscription, even if one is convinced that the conscript will
ultimately benefit from his baptism into what Sax calls the
"secular religion" of preservation. 00
Championing the Antiquities Act thus feels vaguely like
championing the gadgeteer, of whom Leopold wrote: "[T]he
gadgeteer, otherwise known as the sporting-goods dealer.., has
draped the American outdoorsman with an infinity of
contraptions, all offered as aids to self-reliance, hardihood,
woodcraft or marksmanship, but too often functioning as
substitutes for them. 30 ' Sax illustrates this idea of illusory
wilderness experiences in his discussion of the commercial rafting
company that plays on our aspirations for independence and self-
reliance by proposing to take us where John Wesley Powell once
traveled, but promises to do so with all of the luxuries of a
resort fine meals, portable toilets, and river guide valets to carry
intentioned of hikers tend to be more concerned with the brand of their backpacks,
boots, and sleeping bags than with the pleasures of the trail. Keeping the equipment
simple helps achieve harmony with nature's rhythm and identification with wild
places. There is no better goal in wilderness recreation.").
300. See SAX, supra note 16, at 14 (describing the "preservationist position");
id. at 15 (describing the preservationist as "a prophet for a kind of secular religion").
Sax embraces the quasi-religious aspect of preservation: "The preservationist is not
an elitist who wants to exclude others, notwithstanding popular opinion to the
contrary; he is a moralist who wants to convert them." Id. at 14.
301. LEOPOLD, supra note 234, at 214.
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our gear."°2 The United States Forest Service Manual likewise
explains the development of modern campsites to "satisfy the
urbanite's need for compensating experiences and relative
solitude" while ensuring that it will be "obvious to the user that
he is in a secure situation where ample provision is made for his
personal comfort and he will not be called upon to use
undeveloped skills."3 3 Of course, there is little dispute that the
commercial rafting excursion and the night in the amenity-filled
campground are pleasurable experiences. The point is that
without some actual, as opposed to illusory, sacrifice of security
and comfort, the experience only pleases the participant, but does
not ennoble him. Preservationists should not turn to the
Antiquities Act as a substitute for the harder task of legislation
simply because the Act insures security from poor legislative
choices and does not call upon them to use their still-developing
skills in the woodcraft of democracy. When they do so, the
result-preservation-is surely pleasing, but it is unfortunately
robbed of much of its nobility.
If the Antiquities Act is a dubious gadget, does that mean
that preservationists must swallow hard, agree that public lands
protection must withstand the crucible of the legislative process,
and sign onto one of the current legislative reform efforts? This
is a difficult question. In contemplating the answer, it is
important to recognize that avoiding gadgetry, and indeed the
entire ethic of sportsmanship, is a virtue that lies along a
mean." 4 Thoughtful wilderness literature does not advocate
absolute abstention from gadgets, complete elimination of impact,
or total unimportance of the capture.0 5 As Leopold wrote: "I do
302. See SAX, supra note 16, at 94-98; see also ROOSEVELT, supra note 242, at
449 (extolling the virtue of wilderness hunting and remarking that "[sihooting in a
private game preserve is but a dismal parody; the manliest and healthiest features
of the sport are lost with the change of conditions").
303. SAX, supra note 16, at 99-100 (discussing how the United States Forest
Service Manual proposes an illusory wilderness experience). As Sax suggests, there
is an unfortunate "commercial readiness to take an idea full of one kind of
associational quality-an idea like wilderness-and to deprive it in practice of all the
authentic quality that generates the association, to tame it, as Thoreau would have
said." Id. at 97.
304. For a discussion of the concept of how virtuous action lies along a mean
between the vices of excess and deficiency, see ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
bk. II, ch. 6, at 1106a16 to 1110a28 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Publishing Co.
1985).
305. A few enthusiasts do in fact take this sort of extreme view of man's
interaction with wilderness. A witty review of such viewpoints is Jack Hitt, Is
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not pretend to know what is moderation, or where the line is
between legitimate and illegitimate gadgets .... Yet there must
be some limit beyond which money-bought aids to sport destroy
the cultural value of sport."3 °6 The question with gadgetry then
is not so much whether to use gadgets, but what sort and how.
Translated into the Antiquities Act context, the first question
is whether the Act is the sort of gadget that so devalues the
ennobling qualities of a fair and democratic preservation process
that it must be amended or repealed. As suggested by the
discussion above, the answer is yes. To insure a fair process, the
Act needs to be amended to require public participation in the
withdrawal process and mandate explicit consideration of impact
on local communities. Both tasks could be accomplished by
following the approach of section 204 of FLPMA and
incorporating into the Act notice, hearing, and consultation
requirements, as well as an obligation to study and evaluate local
impacts." ' Amendment of the Act along these lines would not
diminish the President's withdrawal power. It would only require
that the power be exercised in a more virtuous manner,
consistent with basic wilderness values.
The tougher issue is whether the President's unilateral
withdrawal authority must also be repealed to insure a fair and
Anything OK Anymore?, OUTSIDE, Dec. 1996, at 110 (reviewing injunctions to
bodysurfers to tread water at all times to avoid stepping on the organisms in the
sand below, to backpackers to wear soft shoes and clothes that blend with the
landscape, and to fishermen to cut the barbs from their hooks and practice a new
philosophy of 'Touch and Go"). In general, however, wilderness writers recognize
that choices about impact and gadgetry are difficult and always involve line-drawing.
See, e.g., FROME, supra note 35, at 102 (recognizing that "[k]eeping the equipment
simple" is the highest "goal" of wilderness recreation); see also supra notes 270-73
and accompanying text (discussing necessary tension between civilization and
wilderness); infra note 329 (discussing how our wilderness endeavors often fall short
of the virtuous ideals we set for ourselves).
306. LEOPOLD, supra note 234, at 215-16; see also id. at 215 (noting that where
line-drawing is necessary: "The answer is not a simple one. Roosevelt did not disdain
the modern rifle; White used freely the aluminum pot, the silk tent, dehydrated
foods. Somehow they used mechanical aids, in moderation, without being used by
them.'); cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 304, at 1109a24 ("[I]t is hard work to be excellent,
since in each case it is hard work to find what is intermediate.").
307. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b), (c) (1994); see also supra notes 287-88 and
accompanying text (discussing FLPMA's withdrawal provisions in more detail). A
similar approach is contained in Senator Murkowski's proposed amendment to the
Antiquities Act. See Public Land Management Participation Act of 1997, S. 691,
105th Cong. § 3 (requiring public participation, mineral surveys, and compliance
with all applicable federal land management and environmental statutes).
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democratic withdrawal process. I suggested earlier that
employing the Act to circumvent the legislative process devalued
the preservation accomplishment because it ignored the
woodcraft of democracy. To this observation, some might respond
that the Act is not anti-democratic at all. The President is the
only official elected by the owner of the public lands, the people
collectively. And the President is only exercising a power that
was delegated to him by Congress."° The first point has some
force but is ultimately unpersuasive because the Constitution, the
people's founding document, gives control over the public lands to
Congress." 9 With respect to the second point, the idea that the
Antiquities Act is a product of legislative woodcraft because it is
a congressional delegation is merely a pleasing illusion. As
explained above, the interpretation of the Antiquities Act adopted
by the President and the courts is rather far removed from the
Act's original purpose of protecting prehistoric ruins and Indian
artifacts.310 Thus, it is hard to -argue that Congress has really
delegated to the President the type of broad withdrawal authority
exercised, for example, in the Grand Staircase designation. 1 ' In
308. See supra note 149 (discussing the delegation doctrine).
309. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Property Clause); see also supra note 77
(quoting and discussing the Property Clause).
310. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
311. Perhaps one could argue that Congress has effectively delegated broad
Antiquities Act authority to the President by acquiescing in a long history of
presidential withdrawals whose primary purpose seems to have been to protect
scenic values rather than objects of historic and scientific interest. See supra notes
84-86 and accompanying text (discussing this history). Although this may be an
accurate description of the judicial affirmation of prior withdrawals, see, e.g., United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (affirming executive withdrawal on
the basis of congressional acquiescence), it is not a persuasive argument. Equating
an absence of congressional repeal with an affirmative delegation ignores the fact
that any repealing legislation must overcome procedural hurdles in Congress as well
as a potential presidential veto. Thus, even though a majority of Congress may
disagree with a broad interpretation of the Antiquities Act, they may not be able to
amend the Act. As Justice Scalia once put it:
[O]ne must ignore rudimentary principles of political science to draw any
conclusions regarding that intent from the failure to enact legislation.
The "complicated check on legislation," The Federalist No. 62, erected by
our Constitution creates an inertia that makes it impossible to assert
with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents
(1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon
how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4)
indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also supra text
accompanying notes 296-97 (discussing the procedural hurdles in Congress).
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the absence of an express delegation, using the Act for large,
scenic designations does eschew the harder woodcraft of real
legislative approval in favor of an illusory delegation.
Despite the problems with these two arguments, it is difficult
to abandon the Antiquities Act's unilateral executive withdrawal
authority because it has been such a powerful force for
preservation.312 There is one approach that not only would
achieve a more virtuous and democratic process but also would
continue the historic use of the Act to accomplish preservation.
Congress could amend the Act to provide for public participation
and consideration of impact, but then explicitly delegate to the
President the sort of broad, unilateral withdrawal authority
exercised in the Grand Staircase designation. Like Odysseus
tying himself to the mast so that he would not respond to the
sirens' song,313 Congress, by enacting such an amendment, would
limit its ability to respond to the call of the powerful development
constituency by interposing the procedural hurdles of the
legislative process in the way of development rather than in the
way of preservation.314 So amended, the Antiquities Act would
represent a noble illustration of legislative woodcraft in the
interest of preservation rather than the current unsatisfying
illusion of delegated authority.
The difficulty with this approach is its political viability. For
Congress to delegate fully and specifically to the President the
broad withdrawal authority exercised in the Grand Staircase
designation, it would need to amend the current language of the
Antiquities Act, which provides for land to be withdrawn because
it contains "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,"3 15
but not simply because it possesses scenic beauty. Allowing the
President to make unilateral withdrawals for scenic purposes also
would effectively eviscerate the FLPMA withdrawal process,
312. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing the preservation
accomplishments of the Antiquities Act).
313. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 151-52 (E.V. Rieu trans., The Chaucer Press,
1946).
314. See supra notes 311 and text accompanying notes 296-97 (discussing the
procedural obstacles in the legislative process). The biggest procedural hurdle, of
course, would be the presidential veto, which has the salutary effect of imposing on
Congress a super-majority requirement before it may dispose of the nation's natural
resources.
315. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994).
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which is hardly a legislative likelihood. Perhaps a more
.politically realistic approach would borrow from that of
Representative Hansen of Utah, who has proposed that the
President retain unilateral withdrawal authority for withdrawals
of up to 50,000 acres.3"' This approach would not necessitate
amendment of the Antiquities Act to include scenic designations
because protection of "landmarks," "structures," and "objects"
could presumably require a 50,000 acre designation. This
approach would thus diminish the disquieting reliance on an
illusory delegation while still giving some boost to preservation.
In the end, the political reality is that amendment of the
Antiquities Act appears as unlikely now317 as it has been
historically.1 ' Accordingly, instead of asking what sort of
Antiquities Act would be best, it may be more productive to turn
to the second question of how the Antiquities Act gadget, and
more broadly how the tools of preservation advocacy, should be
employed. 19
316. See H.R. 1127, 105th Cong. (1997); see also supra notes 228-31 and
accompanying text (discussing this legislation). The President is limited to 50,000
acres per state per year. See id. The bill does not require public participation or
consideration of local impact for designations under 50,000 acres, although it does
require consultation with the governor of the affected state for proposals greater than
50,000 acres. See supra note 231 (discussing this provision). The absence of public
participation and impact consideration is not something that should be borrowed
from the approach of Representative Hansen.
317. Representative Hansen's bill did pass the House, but not by a veto-proof
majority, see 143 CONG. REC. H8502 (Oct. 7, 1997) (229 yeas and 197 nays), and
Senator Hatch's bill remains in committee.
318. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (discussing previous efforts
to amend Antiquities Act).
319. Another gadget of preservation advocacy that must be employed with care
is litigation. Just as the sporting goods dealers have "draped the American
outdoorsman with an infinity of contraptions," LEOPOLD, supra note 234, at 214, the
last 30 years have seen preservationists equipped with a number of new tools to
prevent development and promote protection of the public lands. See, e.g., NEPA,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1994); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543
(1994). With that growth comes a responsibility to employ those tools with restraint
and for a proper purpose, rather than to delay or to challenge reasonable
compromises or decisions. Cf. LEOPOLD, supra note 234, at 212 (encouraging a
"voluntary restraint" on the use of gadgets). Unfortunately, preservation advocates
have not always done so. Should, for example, the Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance ("SUWA") have used the NEPA tool to challenge the BLM's decision to allow
Conoco to go ahead and drill on its federally-leased land within the Monument? See
supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing this challenge). Should
SUWA have been so quick to resort to this legal gadget to prevent Conoco from
exercising its valid existing rights? Dubious attacks on valid existing rights seem
analogous to eschewing virtuous woodcraft in favor of the quick kill or roaded,
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E. Beyond Legal Rules: Ennobling Advocacy of Public
Lands Protection
Regardless of whether the Antiquities Act is amended,
nothing prevents the President from voluntarily engaging in a
worthier monument withdrawal process. In fact, noncompulsory
adherence to a virtuous process would enhance the nobility of the
preservationist project more than obligated adherence to codified
virtue. To quote Leopold again: '"oluntary adherence to an
ethical code elevates the self-respect of the sportsman, but it
should not be forgotten that voluntary disregard of the code
degenerates and depraves him."32  I would suggest that an
ethical code of sorts should guide the President in the withdrawal
process and preservationist advocacy more generally, just like an
ethical code informs the voluntary activities of the sportsman.
Hearkening to wilderness values, one basic principle of what
might also be termed a preservation advocacy ethic is that
preservation activities, like wilderness activities, should avoid
undue impact. Application of this virtue should lead to attempts
to mitigate negative impacts of protective designations on
surrounding communities.32' Avoidance of undue impact likewise
suggests that preservationist efforts should avoid despoliation of
property rights.322 Thus, voluntary adherence to an ethical code
of preservation would presumably result in fewer challenges to
reasonable development of valid existing rights, as occurred in
the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance's challenge to Conoco's
application for a drilling permit.323 Instead, it would produce
convenient access. Plainly, the woodcraft of persuading the federal government to
condemn the right, to work an exchange, or, better yet, of persuading Conoco not to
develop the land, see Jim Woolf, Southern Utah Drilling, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 28,
1997, at Al (showing that SUWA did make this attempt with Conoco), is difficult and
often unsuccessful. But that difficulty does not justify reaching for the gadget of
litigation to accomplish the task. As with using the Antiquities Act, the result may
be pleasing but it is not ennobling. See text accompanying notes 302-03 (discussing
this dichotomy). If the chase for preservation results in despoliation of civil liberty,
the capture is not worth the candle.
320. LEOPOLD, supra note 234, at 212.
321. See supra Part III.C (discussing the need to consider the impact of
withdrawals on local communities).
322. See supra note 319 (discussing this issue).
323. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing this dispute and the
potential problem of over-reliance on the litigation "gadget"). Dubious uses of the
litigation gadget are far too common. See, e.g., Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Dabney, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D. Utah 1998) (challenge to Park Service's
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increased advocacy of purchase or exchange of inheld lands, such
as the plan worked out by Interior Secretary Babbitt and Utah
Governor Leavitt for Utah's school trust lands324 and the
settlement being negotiated with Andalex. 25 The Admin-
istration's negotiation of purchase and exchange agreements for
the New World Mine near Yellowstone National Park326 and the
Headwaters ancient redwood grove in California 327 are further
backcountry management plan for Canyonlands National Park despite the thorough
consideration given to competing uses); Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987
F. Supp. 1349 (D. Wyo. 1997) (challenge to Fish & Wildlife Service's decision to allow
less protection of wolves re-introduced into Yellowstone than would generally be the
case under the Endangered Species Act, even though that diminished protection had
facilitated the wolves reintroduction); Lindsey Kate Shaw, Comment, Land Use Plan-
ning at the National Parks: Canyonlands National Park and Off-Road Vehicles, 68
U. COLO. L. REV. 795 (1997) (discussing compromise necessary to planning process).
Of course, examples of such a lack of restraint are just as evident in the service of de-
velopment. See, e.g., Wyoing Farm Bureau Fed'n, 987 F. Supp. at 1355-56 (farmers'
challenge to reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone on several grounds, including
the argument that the government had not adequately considered the farmers'
comments); Michelle Nijhuis, Oil Clashes with Elk in the Book Cliffs, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Apr. 13, 1998, at 1 (describing Oscar Wyatt's challenge to an initiative which
would have reduced grazing in Utah's Book Cliffs in favor of an increased Elk herd).
Regardless of one's side in the development versus preservation debate, the gadget
of litigation should not be valued over the woodcraft of persuasion and negotiation.
324. See supra Part II.C (discussing the exchange).
325. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing this negotiation).
326. The New World Mine exchange arose out of a plan by Noranda, a
Canadian mining company, to extract an estimated $800 million in gold, silver and
copper from Forest Service lands upstream from Yellowstone National Park, the
Wild and Scenic Clarks Fork of the Yellowstone River, and the Absaroka-Beartooth
Wilderness. See Bob Ekey, The New World Agreement: A Call for Reform of the 1872
Mining Law, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 151, 152 (1997). Responding to
significant opposition to the potential environmental hazards posed by the mine,
Noranda and its subsidiary, Crowne Butte, agreed to a land swap authored by the
Greater Yellowstone Coalition and endorsed by the Clinton Administration to trade
all of its claims in the New World Mine District, covenant not to pursue future
mining in the area, and to establish a $22.5 million escrow account to be applied
towards cleanup of existing pollution in the area in return for an anticipated $65
million worth of federal lands and the settlement of pending and future litigation
related to the mine. See id. at 159-60; see also Murray D. Feldman, The New Public
Land Exchanges: Trading Development Rights in One Area for Public Resources in
Another, 43 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-1, 2-16 to 2-18 (1997) (discussing the deal
and other Administration efforts to use land exchanges to protect sensitive areas).
Congress appropriated the money from the Land and Water Conservation Fund and
the President signed the deal into law on November 20, 1997. See Pub. L. No. 105-
83, § 502, 111 Stat. 1543, 1614-15 (1997); Clinton Signs Money Bill; Vetoes New
World Mine Transfer, PUB. LANDS NEWS, Nov. 27, 1997, at 1.
327. The Headwaters grove exchange grew out of concerns over the logging of
what was the largest old-growth stand of coastal redwoods in private hands. See
Feldman, supra note 326, at 2-24. In 1996, Pacific Lumber, which had previously
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examples of how this aspect of a preservation ethic could operate
in practice, as is the willingness to use the Land and Water
Conservation Fund for these and other acquisitions.328
Admittedly, because the virtues in such an ethical code exist
along a mean, it is difficult to calibrate the point at which efforts
to prevent use of, or access to, valid existing rights become
inappropriate or how generous the federal government should be
.in purchase or exchange negotiations.329 With respect to the last
been enjoined from harvesting because parts of the forest were critical habitat for the
endangered Marbled Murrelet, see Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 942 (1997), began threatening to "salvage log" the
trees in the Headwaters forest and also initiated a takings claim, arguing that the
government had effectively turned its forest into a wildlife preserve. See Ryan Lizza,
Gold Diggers: How Developers Mine the Government, NEW REPUBLIC, May 4, 1998,
at 17. In response to public outcry over the threatened logging and the fear that
Pacific Lumber's takings claim might succeed, the Interior Department and the State
of California negotiated an agreement to buy the Headwaters and other forest tracts
for $380 million. See id.; see also Feldman, supra note 326, at 2-25. But see Lizza,
supra at 17 (observing that critics of the deal claimed that the price was much too
high and accused Pacific Lumber of "environmental extortion"). In the same
legislation as the New World mine deal, see supra note 326 (discussing the
legislation), Congress appropriated $250 million from the Land and Water
Conservation Fund toward acquisition of the Headwaters forest. See Pub. L. No.
105-83, § 501, 111 Stat. 1543, 1610-11 (1997); Clinton Signs Money Bill; Vetoes New
World Mine Transfer, supra note 324; William Booth, Calif., U.S. to Pay $495 Million
for Ancient Redwood Grove, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1998, at A3 (discussing California's
approval of purchase). The acquisition will become effective after the Interior
Department prepares an EIS for a habitat conservation plan. See id.
328. See Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4
to 4601-11 (1994). The Land and Water Conservation Fund ("LCWF') is the primary
funding source for federal purchases of land for recreation and wildlife purposes. See
generally COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 19, § 10C.06 (discussing federal land
reacquisition and the LCWF). It is funded primarily by revenues from federal
offshore oil and gas leasing revenues. See id. Congress must authorize use of the
funds and, unfortunately, for many years spending has been far below authorized
levels. See id.; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 18 n.82 (1997) ("If all revenues nominally credited to the Fund are counted,
its accumulated unexpended (because unappropriated) surplus now exceeds $10
billion." (citing Congressional Research Serv., Land and Water Conservation Fund:
Current Funding (visited Sept. 12, 1997) <http://www.cnie.org/nle/nrgen-l.html>)).
The LCWF was used to fund the Headwaters and New World Mine purchases. See
House and Senate Reach New World, Headwaters Agreements, PUBLIC LANDS NEWS,
Oct. 30, 1997, at 5. And it will be used to fund a number of other purposes under the
budget deal President Clinton struck with Congress in 1997. See id.; see also White
House Fact Sheet on Land, Water Conservation Fund, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 2, 1998
(press release discussing LCWF acquisitions in Clinton Administration's proposed
1998 budget).
329. See supra notes 304-06 and accompanying text (discussing how wilderness
virtues lie along a mean). Of course, not only do wilderness virtues lie along a mean
but also they are in some measure aspirational. Our wilderness endeavors often fall
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question, perhaps the best example of an appropriate ethic is
President Clinton's decision in negotiating the exchange of school
lands within the Grand Staircase that "reasonable differences in
valuation" would be resolved "in favor of the school trust. 33 °
Likewise, in deciding whether to challenge use of a valid existing
right, reasonable differences should again be resolved "in favor"
of the right. The principle is that avoiding despoliation of
property rights should be understood as an ethical, and not just
a constitutional,3 ' obligation.
In the end, the overarching principle of a preservation
advocacy ethic is that the "chase" for preservation is just as
important, if not more important, than its "capture." Achieving
preservation should not come at the expense of a fair process.
With this in mind, the President should seek to include the public
and preservationists should advocate public inclusion in
monument withdrawal decisions, even though not required by the
Antiquities Act.332 More generally, this primary principle
short of the ideals we set for ourselves. See, e.g., FROME, supra note 35, at 102
("Even the best intentioned of hikers tend to be more concerned with the brand of
their backpacks, boots, and sleeping bags than with the pleasures of the trail."); SAX,
supra note 16, at 37 (discussing tension in climbing literature between the aspiration
of purist climbing techniques and the drive to summit at any cost). But to admit that
virtuous habits are not easy to come by is not to say that they are pointless.
Knowledge of basic wilderness virtues should motivate us to refine our behavior and,
at very least, cause us to ask whether there is a better way, whether an activity could
be accomplished with less impact, whether we are substituting gadgetry for
woodcraft, and whether our motives are appropriate. See, e.g., ALDO LEOPOLD, THE
ROUND RIVER 155 (Oxford University Press 1953) ("We shall never achieve harmony
with [the] land, any more than we shall achieve justice or liberty for people. In these
higher aspirations the important thing is not to achieve, but to strive."); see also
JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH, THE BEST NATURE WRITING OF JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH 157
(University of Utah Press 1995) (making similar point). Asking ourselves these same
questions in the context of the withdrawal process and preservation advocacy would
have similarly beneficial results.
330. See President's Remarks, supra note 118.
331. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (takings provision); see also supra note 170
(discussing takings law).
332. See supra Part III.B (discussing the need for public participation).
Logically, application of a voluntary code of preservation ethics to the monument
withdrawal process would include not only public participation, but also
consideration of community impact and the other virtues discussed above that
ideally would inform amendment of the Antiquities Act. In fact, voluntary adherence
to a virtuous withdrawal procedure would suggest that with respect to large scenic
designations like the Grand Staircase, a President should rely on FLPMA and
abstain from using the Antiquities Act. Until the woodcraft of the legislative process
is employed to amend the Act and make clear that Congress has delegated the
authority to make such large scenic designations, using the Act will be analogous to
1999] UTAH'S GRAND STAIRCASE
instructs preservationists that the nobility of the preservationist
project is linked just as closely to its methods as it is to its results.
When preservationists work to protect public lands by resorting
to the gadgets of profligate litigation or dubious executive action
instead of patiently relying on the woodcraft of persuasion, they
risk becoming mere trophy hunters and conquerors, torn between
a desire to trumpet their conquest and an uncomfortable
knowledge of how the victory was achieved.3 3 The protected
lands become something like the collection of old world
antiquities in the British Museum-one of the country's
undeniable jewels, yet one that is forever tarnished by the method
of its acquisition.334
IV. CONCLUSION
The Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument will
surely come to be regarded as one of the jewels of our national
park and national monument system. It is unfortunate that the
cost of that jewel was some of the nobility of the preservationist
project. Ultimately, the lesson to be drawn from the Grand Stair-
case designation is that the wilderness values of sportsmanship,
avoidance of impact, restraint, and patient reliance on woodcraft
instead of powerful gadgetry are not simply quaint ideals to be
applied to our interaction with wilderness. Rather, they are an
expression of broader virtues that are equally applicable to the
relying on an illusion that is pleasing but not ennobling. See supra notes 302-03 and
accompanying text (discussing how reliance on an illusion pleases but does not
ennoble); see also supra notes 312-16 and accompanying text (advocating amendment
of the Act to expressly delegate to the President broad, unilateral withdrawal
authority rather than continuing to rely on an illusory delegation). But even if one
accepts the notion that Congress by its acquiescence has actually delegated such
broad Antiquities Act authority to the President, see supra note 311 (suggesting the
theoretical weakness of this delegation argument), the President should at least
employ the Antiquities Act tool in a virtuous manner.
333. See supra note 264 (John Steinbeck's comment on this dilemma for trophy
hunters).
334. For a review of the most famous dispute about the British Museum's
antiquities collection, namely whether the Elgin Marbles, taken from the walls of the
Parthenon, should be repatriated to Greece, see John H. Merryman, Thinking About
the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1881 (1985); T.R. Reid, A Tug-of-War Over
Damaged Greek Masterwork, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 31, 1998, at 2 (discussing
recent developments in the debate). For a more general overview of the problems
engendered by such historical decisions to remove cultural property from its country
of origin, see John H. Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 339 (1989).
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withdrawal process and the task of preservation advocacy.
Application of those virtues suggests that the Antiquities Act
should be amended to provide for public participation in the
withdrawal process and consideration of local community impact,
and to clarify the extent of Congress's delegated withdrawal
authority. In the event that the Act is not amended, adherence
to these values should be the voluntary ambition of
preservationists, and preservation-minded presidents, because
the virtue of the project depends upon it.
